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I. Introduction
In March of 2021, Deb Haaland became the first Indian1 to serve as the
United States Secretary of the Interior.2 Secretary Haaland’s historic confirmation

*
Assistant Professor, Antonin Scalia Law School, George Mason University; Director,
Tribal Law & Economics Program, at the Law & Economics Center; Associate Professor and
Managing Fellow, Native American Law and Policy Institute, Southern University Law Center;
Campbell Fellow, the Hoover Institution at Stanford University; Associate Justice, Pascua Yaqui
Tribe. Funding for this project was provided by the Institute for Humane Studies. I would like to
thank Pilar Thomas, Peter Ortego, and Alison Geisler, for their assistance with this article.
1
Indian is used in this Article to denote the indigenous peoples of present-day North
America. This article uses the term “Indian” rather than “Native American” because it is the proper
legal term as well as the preferred term of many Indians. See, e.g., Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians,
https://www.choctaw.org/ [https://perma.cc/899M-SCGQ]; Southern Ute Indian Tribe, https://
www.southernute-nsn.gov/ [https://perma.cc/8CS5-RQV8]; Quinault Indian Nation, http://
www.quinaultindiannation.com/ [https://perma.cc/QEN3-3EXR].

2

Nathan Rott, Deb Haaland Confirmed as 1st Native American Interior Secretary, NPR (Mar.
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was widely celebrated,3 but people interested in oil production expressed
concerns regarding whether Haaland’s confirmation would adversely impact the
oil industry.4 As Secretary of the Interior, Haaland oversees approximately five
hundred million acres of land and significant oil reserves.5 Fifty-six million acres
of those lands are Indian country.6 Indian country7 also holds approximately
twenty percent of the United States oil reserves;8 thus, oil and gas is the lifeblood
of several tribal economies.9 Nevertheless, Haaland received broad support from

15, 2021, 6:21 PM ET), https://www.npr.org/2021/03/15/977558590/deb-haaland-confirmed-asfirst-native-american-interior-secretary [https://perma.cc/M3T2-3EYX].
Tony Iallonardo, Dozens of Groups Cheer Secretary Haaland as She Takes the Reins at Interior,
Wilderness Soc’y (Mar. 15, 2021), https://www.wilderness.org/articles/press-release/dozensgroups-cheer-secretary-haaland-she-takes-reins-interior [https://perma.cc/DSU9-U4MF]; Brian
Roewe, Indigenous, Environmental Groups Celebrate Haaland’s Cabinet Confirmation, EarthBeat
(Mar. 17, 2021), https://www.ncronline.org/news/earthbeat/indigenous-environmental-groupscelebrate-haalands-cabinet-confirmation [https://perma.cc/M3T2-3EYX].
3

4
See Chris Casteel, Despite Strong Support from Tribes, Haaland Nomination Opposed by
Oklahoma Senators, Oklahoman (Mar. 16, 2021, 6:37 PM CT), https://www.oklahoman.com/
story/news/2021/03/16/deb-haaland-climate-change-oil-oklahoma-energy-policy-native-americantribes/4719483001/ [https://perma.cc/FK9G-YGP3] (“Sens. Jim Inhofe and James Lankford both
cited Haaland’s positions on energy production as the reason for their opposition, as did many other
Republicans.”); Bobby Magill, Drilling Fight Near Tribal Land Near Tribal Site Shows Challenge
Awaiting Haaland, Bloomberg L. (Feb. 10, 2021, 2:30 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/
environment-and-energy/drilling-fight-near-tribal-site-shows-challenge-awaiting-haaland [https://
perma.cc/7BXV-GVEV] (“Sen. Steve Daines (R-Mont.) pledged Feb. 5 that he’ll block Haaland’s
nomination because of her ‘radical views’ opposing fossil fuels, including supporting President Joe
Biden’s pause on federal oil and gas leasing.”).
5
See Mark K. DeSantis, Cong. Rsch. Serv., R45480, U.S. Department of the
Interior: An Overview 1 (2021), https://sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/R45480.pdf [https://perma.cc/
T9RS-D65W].
6
Frequently Asked Questions: What is a federal Indian Reservation?, Bureau of Indian Affs.,
U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, https://www.bia.gov/frequently-asked-questions [https://perma.cc/
SFC3-DC2Z]; see infra note 7 and accompanying text.

18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2018) (“Except as otherwise provided in sections 1154 and 1156 of
this title, the term ‘Indian country’, as used in this chapter, means (a) all land within the limits of
any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the United States Government, notwithstanding
the issuance of any patent, and, including rights-of-way running through the reservation, (b) all
dependent Indian communities within the borders of the United States whether within the original
or subsequently acquired territory thereof, and whether within or without the limits of a state, and
(c) all Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which have not been extinguished, including rights-ofway running through the same.”).
7

8
Shawn E. Regan & Terry L. Anderson, Prop. & Env’t Res. Ctr., George W.
Bush Inst., The Energy Wealth of Indian Nations 2 (2013), https://www.perc.org/wpcontent/uploads/old/GWBI-EnergyWealthIndianNations.pdf [https://perma.cc/2KGB-UGCQ]
[hereinafter Regan & Anderson, Energy Wealth] (“Indian reservations contain almost . . . 20% of
known oil and gas reserves . . . .”).
9
See Joaqlin Estus, Tribes’ Billion Dollar Oil Industry . . . and Now?, Indian Country
Today (Apr. 22, 2020), https://indiancountrytoday.com/news/tribes-billion-dollar-oil-industryand-now#:~:text=The%20ten%20or%20so%20tribes,the%20Osage%20Nation%20in%20
Oklahoma [https://perma.cc/3GYY-8XRZ].
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Indian tribes.10 Oil-producing tribes, like the Osage Nation, hope Haaland will
help reduce the federal red tape impeding tribal energy production.11
Federally imposed regulations prevent tribes from controlling their natural
resources. For example, the Southern Ute Indian Tribe owns one of the most
successful oil companies in the United States.12 Although the Southern Ute Indian
Tribe has substantial oil reserves on its reservation,13 the Southern Ute can begin
producing oil more quickly and efficiently in the Gulf of Mexico than on its
own Colorado-based reservation.14 Privately-owned oil companies also prefer to
operate outside of Indian country; in fact, a 2012 Office of the Inspector General
report found “the oil and gas industry generally considers Indian leases to be
their lowest priority, preferring to lease private, state, and federal lands first.”15

Felicia Fonseca, ‘Monumental Day’: Indian Country Reacts to Deb Haaland Vote, AP
(Mar. 15, 2021), https://apnews.com/article/biden-cabinet-oklahoma-cabinets-native-americans42b974d8d00a5865c24c4304671fc935 [https://perma.cc/SQ95-KQNM]; Liz Mineo, For the
First Time, a Native American May Oversee U.S. Policies on Tribal Nations, Harv. Gazette (Feb.
16, 2021), https://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2021/02/importance-of-appointing-a-nativeamerican-as-secretary-of-interior/ [https://perma.cc/BT2X-77MY] (“I heard a collective cheer
across Indian Country when Rep. Deb Haaland was tapped to lead the U.S. Department of Interior
by then-President-elect Biden. Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram were alive with posts celebrating
the announcement, highlighting her groundbreaking career of service and leadership, filled with
‘firsts.’”); Dennis Zotigh, Reactions from Indian Country to Deb Haaland’s Confirmation as Secretary
of the Interior, Nat’l Museum of the Am. Indian, Smithsonian Mag. (Mar. 18, 2021), https://
www.smithsonianmag.com/blogs/national-museum-american-indian/2021/03/18/reactionsindian-country-deb-haalands-confirmation-secretary-interior/ [https://perma.cc/7SDM-TBZU].
10

11
Allison Herrera, Energy-Producing Tribal Nation Hopes New Interior Secretary Will Make
Drilling Easier, NPR (Mar. 18, 2021, 7:49 PM ET), https://www.npr.org/2021/03/18/978349668/
energy-producing-tribal-nation-hopes-new-interior-secretary-will-make-drilling-e [https://perma.
cc/V2ZV-K8EA] (“One of the problems Waller wants Haaland’s help with is cutting through the
red tape and bureaucracy of the Bureau of Indian Affairs. Tribal nations have more hurdles to jump
through to get oil and gas leases than do many corporation [sic].”).
12
See Our Purpose, Red Willow Prod. Co., Southern Ute Indian Tribe, https://www.
rwpc.us/ [https://perma.cc/ZQ4E-WCGF] (last visited Nov. 13, 2021) (“[Red Willow Production,
LLC] has grown significantly since inception and is now one of the top 25 largest privately owned
oil and gas companies in the US.”).
13
See generally Bureau of Indian Affs., U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Atlas of Oil
& Gas Plays on American Indian Lands: Southern Ute Indian Reservation, https://
www.indianaffairs.gov/sites/bia.gov/files/assets/as-ia/ieed/ieed/pdf/DEMD_OG_SouthernUte_
OilGasPlays_508.pdf [https://perma.cc/E673-2AMS] (“The Southern Ute Indian Tribe is blessed
with an abundance of valuable natural resources. A major source of revenue for the Tribe is the
production of oil and natural gas.”).

See Bureau of Indian Affs., U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Transcript of Tribal Consultation,
Identifying Economic Priorities in Indian Country 5 (Aug. 17, 2017), https://www.bia.gov/sites/
bia_prod.opengov.ibmcloud.com/files/assets/as-ia/raca/pdf/08-17-17.Albuquerque%20NM%20
Transcript_Indian%20Traders%2025%20CFR%20140.pdf [https://perma.cc/CJ39-PYDS].
14

Off. of Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Report No.: CR-EVBIA-0001-2011, Oil and Gas Leasing in Indian Country: An Opportunity for Economic
Development 4 (2012), https://www.doioig.gov/sites/doioig.gov/files/CR-EV-BIA-00012011Public.pdf [https://perma.cc/S9GL-27HZ].
15

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2022

3

Wyoming Law Review, Vol. 22 [2022], No. 1, Art. 2

28

Wyoming Law Review

Vol. 22

Indeed, private oil companies oppose lands being classified as Indian country due
to Indian country’s complex federal regulatory scheme.16
Although tribal self-determination—allowing tribes to choose their own
path—has been the United States’ Indian policy since 1975,17 tribes still do not
control their own natural resources.18 Indian country remains laden with federal
oversight because the federal government remains the tribes’ trustee.19 This means
the federal government owns the tribal and Indian trust land while the tribe or
Indian retains beneficial use rights.20 Thus, engaging in Indian country energy
production requires leasing land from the federal government,21 and this begins
the journey down a byzantine bureaucratic vortex.22 Thanks to federal bureaucracy,

See, e.g., Brief of Okla. Indep. Petrol. Ass’n as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner
at 903, Murphy v. Royal, 875 F.3d 896 (10th Cir. 2017) (No. 17-1104), aff’d sub nom. Sharp v.
Murphy, 140 S. Ct 2452 (2020).
16

17
See Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 93638, 88 Stat. 2203 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 5301–5423); Exec. Order No. 13175, 65
Fed. Reg. 67,249 (Nov. 6, 2000); Statement on Signing the Indian Self-Determination Assistance
Act Amendments of 1988, 2 Pub. Papers 1284–85 (Oct. 5, 1988); Statement Reaffirming the
Government-to-Government Relationship Between the Federal Government and Indian Tribal
Governments, 1 Pub. Papers 662–63 (June 14, 1991); Statement on Signing the Executive Order
on Consultation and Coordination with Indian Tribal Governments, 3 Pub. Papers 2487–88 (Nov.
6, 2000); Memorandum on Government-to-Government Relationship with Tribal Governments,
2 Pub. Papers 2177 (Sep. 23, 2004); Exec. Off. of the President, 2016 White House Tribal
Nations Conference Progress Report: A Renewed Era of Federal–Tribal Relations
(2017), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/whncaa_report.pdf [https://
perma.cc/439W-2QWH]; Alysa Landry, Jimmy Carter: Signed ICWA into Law, Indian Country
Today (Sep. 12, 2017), [https://perma.cc/X4HS-9FDQ].
18
Maura Grogan et al., Revenue Watch Inst., Native American Lands and
Natural Resource Development 16 (2011), https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/
documents/rwi_native_american_lands_2011.pdf [https://perma.cc/2MHE-3U4K] (“Yet even in
the contemporary era of self-determination, a tribe’s freedom to develop its energy resources is
constrained by external approvals and controls.”); Shawn E. Regan & Terry L. Anderson, The Energy
Wealth of Indian Nations, 3 LSU J. of Energy L. & Res. 195, 201 (2014) [hereinafter Regan &
Anderson, Energy Wealth of Indian Nations] (“Therefore, although tribal sovereignty implied the
right for Indians to govern themselves, it did not grant tribes complete autonomy to devise their
own property rights and governance structures.”).
19
Regan & Anderson, Energy Wealth of Indian Nations, supra note 18, at 201 (“This trust
relationship between Indians and the federal government, which continues today, extends to surface
and subsurface resources.”).
20
Adam Crepelle, Decolonizing Reservation Economies: Returning to Private Enterprise and
Trade, 12 J. Bus. Entrepreneurship & L. 413, 443 (2019) [hereinafter Crepelle, Decolonizing
Reservation Economies] (“Having land held in trust means the federal government holds title to the
land while the tribe or an individual Indian has rights to use the land.”).
21

See 25 C.F.R. § 212.1 (2021).

See Grogan et al., supra note 18, at 3 (“Depending on the resource being extracted, and
on the land containing the resource, at least four federal agencies are involved in the execution of
each lease.”).
22
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a task as mundane as a title search can take over six years.23 The same title search
takes just a few days outside of Indian country.24
Federal bureaucracy is not the only obstacle to Indian country oil production.
The colonially-inspired body of federal Indian law continues to constrict tribal
sovereignty.25 Federal Indian law limits the scope of tribal jurisdiction over nonIndians, and this limitation results in uncertainty over when tribal courts can assert
jurisdiction over non-Indians.26 This uncertainty can lead to lengthy and costly
litigation which oil companies avoid by operating outside of Indian country.27
Federal Indian law also causes trouble for tribes by permitting states to tax Indian
country oil production though states have no corresponding duty to provide services
to tribes.28 State taxes make it infeasible for tribes to levy taxes on their natural
resources.29 Without tax revenue, tribes lack the basic infrastructure needed to
facilitate oil production as well as other economic ventures.30 Companies avoid
dual taxation by operating outside of Indian country.31
As a result of the above issues, few places on earth are as barren of private
businesses as Indian country.32 No private businesses means there are few private
sector jobs in Indian country;33 hence, Indian country’s unemployment rate has
hovered around fifty percent for decades.34 Lack of employment opportunities
translates to poverty. Consequently, Indians have the highest poverty rate in the

23

See Regan & Anderson, Energy Wealth of Indian Nations, supra note 18, at 209.

24

Id.

See Adam Crepelle, Lies, Damn Lies, and Federal Indian Law: The Ethics of Citing Racist
Precedent in Contemporary Federal Indian Law, 44 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 529, 530–32
(2021) [hereinafter Crepelle, Citing Racist Precedent].
25

26

See infra Part III.C.

27

See infra Part III.A.

28

See infra Part III.B.

29

See infra notes 151–180 and accompanying text.

30

See infra notes 180–195 and accompanying text.

Adam Crepelle, How Federal Indian Law Prevents Business Development in Indian Country,
23 U. Pa. J. Bus. L. 683, 725–26 (2021) [hereinafter Crepelle, Business Development].
31

32
See Elizabeth Ann Kronk Warner, Tribal Renewable Energy Development Under the
HEARTH Act: An Independently Rational, But Collectively Deficient, Option, 55 Ariz. L. Rev. 1031,
1044 (2013) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 112-427, at 454 (2012) that “[p]rivate investment within
Indian reservations—except in the anomalous case of Indian gaming . . . is about as scarce as it is in
any nation where ownership of property is highly restricted by national governments”).
33

Crepelle, Business Development, supra note 31, at 691.

Unemployment on Indian Reservations at 50 Percent: The Urgent Need to Create Jobs in
Indian Country: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affs., 111th Cong. 1 (2010) (statement of
Hon. Byron L. Dorgan, Chairman, S. Comm. on Indian Affs.).
34
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United States.35 Likewise, tribal governments are often grossly underfunded.36
Without funds, tribes struggle to provide basic infrastructure such as roads,37
safe water,38 and electricity.39 The lack of infrastructure makes tribal economic
development all the more difficult.40 Enabling tribes to develop their resources is
one solution to tribal economic doldrums.
However, this is not to say tribes must develop their natural resources. The
Northern Cheyenne Tribe chooses not to develop its tremendous coal, oil, and
natural gas reserves.41 Likewise, the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe opposed an oil

35
Making Indian Country Count: Native Americans and the 2020 Census: Hearing Before
the S. Comm. on Indian Affs., 115th Cong. 26 (2018) (statement of James T. Tucker, Pro Bono
Voting Rts. Couns., Native Am. Rights Fund) (“Native peoples have the highest poverty rate of any
population group, 26.6 percent, which is nearly double the poverty rate of the nation as a whole.
The poverty rate was even higher on federally recognized Indian reservations and Alaska Native
villages, at 38.3 percent.”); Indian Country Demographics, Nat’l Cong. of Am. Indians (June 1,
2020), https://www.ncai.org/about-tribes/demographics [https://perma.cc/U8QB-ZYPA] (“The
percentage of American Indian and Alaska Natives living in poverty in 2017 was estimated to be
26.8%. This compares to 14.6% for the nation as a whole.”).
36
See Adam Crepelle, Tribes, Vaccines, and COVID-19: A Look at Tribal Responses to the
Pandemic, 49 Fordham Urban L.J. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 6) (on file with author)
(“Despite having trust and treaty obligations to tribes, the United States persistently underfunds
tribal governments.”); U.S. Comm’n on C.R., A Quiet Crisis: Federal Funding and Unmet
Needs in Indian Country 6 (2003), http://www.usccr.gov/pubs/na0703/na0731.pdf [https://
perma.cc/8L7Y-NM59].

Enhancing Tribal Self-Governance and Safety of Indian Roads: Hearing Before the S. Comm.
on Indian Affs., 116th Cong. 21 (2019) (statement of Hon. Joe Garcia, Head Councilman, Ohkay
Owingeh Pueblo) (“Altogether, the 42,000 miles of roads in Indian Country are still among the
most underdeveloped, unsafe, and poorly maintained road networks in the nation . . . .”).
37

Democratic Staff of the House Comm. on Nat. Res., Water Delayed Is Water
Denied: How Congress has Blocked Access to Water for Native Families, at Exec. Summary
(2016),
http://blackfeetnation.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/House-NRC-Water-ReportMinority-10-10-16.pdf [https://perma.cc/V8D9- TCRA] (“Over a half million people—nearly
48% of tribal homes—in Native communities across the United States do not have access to reliable
water sources, clean drinking water, or basic sanitation.”).
38

39
Laurel Morales, For Many Navajos, Getting Hooked Up to the Power Grid Can Be
Life-Changing, NPR (May 29, 2019, 5:00 AM ET), https://www.npr.org/sections/healthshots/2019/05/29/726615238/for-many-navajos-getting-hooked-up-to-the-power-grid-can-belifechanging [https://perma.cc/DY2A-Y456] (“About 10% of Navajos on the reservation live without
electricity.”); Energy and Minerals, Nat’l Cong. Of Am. Indians, http://www.ncai.org/policyissues/land-natural-resources/energy-and-minerals [https://perma.cc/XXD2-PJT5] (“Many tribal
homes lack access to electricity and affordable heating sources.”); Native Energy: Rural Electrification
on Tribal Lands, Rocky Mtn. Inst. (June 24, 2014), https://rmi.org/blog_2014_06_24_native_
energy_rural_electrification_on_tribal_lands [https://perma.cc/CEP7-D56W] (“If I told you about
a place where almost 40 percent of the people live without electricity, over 90 percent live below
the poverty line, and the unemployment rate exceeds 80 percent, you might be picturing a rural
village in Africa or some other developing country. However, this community is actually within
U.S. borders. I’m talking about the Pine Ridge Reservation in South Dakota, home to the Oglala
Lakota.”).
40

See Crepelle, Business Development, supra note 31, at 727–29.

41

Grogan et al., supra note 18, at 7 (“Some tribes, like the Northern Cheyenne,

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol22/iss1/2
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pipeline crossing its water supply and historic lands.42 Nor is this a proposal to
privatize Indian reservations.43 Rather, this is a call to expand tribal sovereignty and
allow tribes to choose what happens to their natural resources.44 As Ron Crossguns
of the Blackfeet Nation’s Oil and Gas Department said, “[i]t’s our right. We say
yes or no. I don’t think the outside world should come out here and dictate to us
what we should do with our properties.”45
While vast systemic reform is needed, this article focuses on finding alternative
paths to Indian country oil production within the existing legal framework. Tribes
with sufficient financial resources can leverage the 2017 amendments to the Indian
Tribal Energy Development and Self-Determination Act (ITEDSDA)46 to create
Tribal Energy Development Organizations (TEDOs).47 TEDOs have received scarce
scholarly attention yet are a vital tool that enables tribes to slice through several layers
of federal red tape.48 Additionally, tribes can resort to the Constitution and make

have elected not to mine their substantial coal reserves (although there is pressure even within
the tribe to change that stance.”); Clara Caufield, Northern Cheyenne and Coal—Sixty Year LoveHate Relationship, Native Times (Mar. 20, 2014), https://www.nativetimes.com/index.php/
news/environment/9699-northern-cheyenne-and-coal-sixty-year-love-hate-relationship [https://
perma.cc/N7AS-FNHA] (“[I]n the 1960’s the Northern Cheyenne Tribe once again successfully
(undermanned, underfunded, understaffed and underdog) went to war with the US Government.
This time stopping development of huge tribal coal reserves, leased out by the BIA: getting Congress
to cancel those leases and later winning a Supreme Court decision (the Hollowbreast Case) clarifying
that the Tribe owns all reservation mineral rights (coal, oil and gas, water and timber).”); Nathan
Rott, People of Coal-Rich Northern Cheyenne Torn Between Jobs and Sacred Culture, NPR (June 25,
2017, 7:00 AM ET), https://www.npr.org/2017/06/25/533982860/people-of-coal-rich-northerncheyenne-torn-between-jobs-and-sacred-culture [https://perma.cc/L5CJ-Q9LW] (“But despite
high unemployment and systemic poverty, the Northern Cheyenne Tribe has never touched the
coal. It has spurned developers and scuttled plans. Most recently, it sued the Trump administration
for opening up the opportunity for new coal development in its corner of southeastern Montana.”).
42
Setting the Record Straight: Standing Rock’s Engagement in The Dakota Access Pipeline,
Earth Just., https://earthjustice.org/sites/default/files/files/Setting-the-Record-Straight-2.23.17.
pdf [https://perma.cc/Z9W2-37CS]; see also Updates & FAQs: The Standing Rock Sioux Tribe’s
Litigation on the Dakota Access Pipeline, Earth Just., https://earthjustice.org/features/faq-standingrock-litigation [https://perma.cc/X3G4-57KV].
43
But see Valerie Volcovici, Trump Advisors Aim to Privatize Oil-Rich Indian Reservations,
Reuters (Dec. 5, 2016, 3:23 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-tribes-insightidUSKBN13U1B1 [https://perma.cc/SB4M-RAX7] [hereinafter Volcovici, Privatize Oil-Rich
Indian Reservations].
44
United States v. Shoshone Tribe of Indians of Wind River Rsrv., 304 U.S. 111, 117
(1938) (“As transactions between a guardian and his wards are to be construed favorably to the latter,
doubts, if there were any, as to ownership of lands, minerals or timber would be resolved in favor of
the tribe.”).
45
Regan & Anderson, Energy Wealth of Indian Nations, supra note 18, at 216 (quoting
Rebecca Centeno, A Conversation with Ron Crossguns, Blackfeet Oil and Gas Department, YouTube
(Oct. 21, 2012), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KFFxmUfI2mk [http://perma.cc/DL33YLRL]).
46
Indian Tribal Energy Development and Self-Determination Act Amendments of 2017,
Pub. L. No. 115-325, 132 Stat. 4445 (2018).
47

Id. § 105.

48

See infra Part III.A.
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a compelling case the sui generis and complicated bureaucracy that only applies to
Indian country is irrational and violates the Due Process Clause.49 Moreover, the
regulations deprive tribes of rights to their minerals and constitute a regulatory
taking.50 So long as the federal bureaucracy remains in place, tribes should urge
the federal government to replace bureaucrats with technology, like blockchain.51
The remainder of this article proceeds in the following order. Part II provides a
historic overview of the federal government’s involvement in tribal oil production.
Part III discusses how federal Indian law presents obstacles to contemporary
Indian country oil production. Part IV presents three solutions to circumvent
the federal barriers to Indian country oil production.

II. The History of Federal Control of Tribal Land and Oil
Since the United States’ founding, tribal land and oil rights—like all tribal
rights—have been at the mercy of the United States’ Indian policy. Europeans
claimed Indian lands through the Doctrine of Discovery,52 an international legal
principle that divests non-Christian, non-Europeans of land rights as soon as a
Christian European arrives.53 The United States formally incorporated the Doctrine
of Discovery into law in 1823.54 As a result, the United States owned all land within
its borders, and the Indians’ land rights were reduced to occupancy.55 The Supreme
Court built upon the Doctrine of Discovery to hold that tribes were no longer
full sovereigns but “domestic dependent nations” in 1831.56 The Court explained

49

See infra Part IV.B.

50

See infra Part IV.B.

51

See infra Part IV.C.

Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 573 (1823) (“The exclusion of all other
Europeans, necessarily gave to the nation making the discovery the sole right of acquiring the soil
from the natives, and establishing settlements upon it.”).
52

53
Robert J. Miller, American Indians, the Doctrine of Discovery, and Manifest Destiny, 11
Wyo. L. Rev. 329, 330–31 (2011) (“The English colonists in North America and then the American
colonial, state, and federal governments all utilized the Doctrine and its religious, cultural, and racial
ideas of superiority over Native Americans to stake legal claims to the lands and property rights
of the indigenous peoples.”); Robert A. Williams, Jr., Encounters on the Frontiers of International
Human Rights Law: Redefining the Terms of Indigenous Peoples’ Survival in the World, 1990 Duke L.J.
660, 672 (“For five hundred years, this doctrine and its discourse of diminished indigenous legal
status and rights has been relied on by European and European-derived settler states to regulate and
legitimate their colonial activities in indigenous peoples’ territories.”).
54
See Johnson, 21 U.S. at 591 (“However extravagant the pretension of converting the
discovery of an inhabited country into conquest may appear; if the principle has been asserted in
the first instance, and afterwards sustained; if a country has been acquired and held under it; if the
property of the great mass of the community originates in it, it becomes the law of the land, and
cannot be questioned.”).
55
Id. at 592 (“The absolute ultimate title has been considered as acquired by discovery,
subject only to the Indian title of occupancy, which title the discoverers possessed the exclusive right
of acquiring.”).
56

Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831).
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this means tribes “are in a state of pupilage. Their relationship to the United States
resembles that of a ward to his guardian.”57 This is the basis of the present-day trust
relationship between tribes and the federal government.58
The following year, the Court held tribal sovereignty precludes state law’s
application in Indian country absent tribal or federal permission;59 nevertheless,
President Andrew Jackson refused to enforce the decision,60 catalyzing
Indian removal.61 By the mid-1800s, most tribes had been relocated to
reservations.62 The purpose of reservations was to destroy tribal cultures and

57

Id.

Adam Crepelle, The Time Trap: Addressing the Stereotypes that Undermine Tribal Sovereignty,
Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2022) (manuscript at 8) (on file with author) [hereinafter
Crepelle, Time Trap]; Memorandum from Hilary C. Tompkins, Solic., U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, to
Sally Jewell, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior 3 (Jan. 18, 2017), https://www.doi.gov/sites/doi.gov/
files/uploads/m-37045.pdf [https://perma.cc/SKT8-6Q4P] (“The Court defined this relationship
as that of a ‘ward to his guardian,’ and recognized tribes as ‘domestic dependent nations,’ thus
establishing what we currently understand as the federal government’s trust relationship with and
obligations towards Indian tribes.”). See also Crepelle, Citing Racist Precedent, supra note 25, at
546 (“The modern-day trust relationship between tribes and the federal government is just a less
paternalistic way of stating the relationship between tribes and the federal government is like ‘that
of a ward to his guardian.’”).
58

59
See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 561 (1832) (“The Cherokee nation, then,
is a distinct community occupying its own territory, with boundaries accurately described, in which
the laws of Georgia can have no force, and which the citizens of Georgia have no right to enter, but
with the assent of the Cherokees themselves, or in conformity with treaties, and with the acts of
congress.”).

Tim Alan Garrison, Worcester v. Georgia (1832), New Ga. Encyc. (Feb. 20, 2018),
https://www.georgiaencyclopedia.org/articles/government-politics/worcester-v-georgia-1832
[https://perma.cc/CMV7-B9WN] (“Georgia ignored the Supreme Court’s ruling, refused to release
the missionaries, and continued to press the federal government to remove the Cherokees. President
Jackson did not enforce the decision against the state and instead called on the Cherokee to relocate
or fall under Georgia’s jurisdiction.”); Worcester v. Georgia, Encyc. Britannica (Feb. 24, 2021),
https://www.britannica.com/topic/Worcester-v-Georgia [https://perma.cc/Z4X7-F2PB] (“Pres.
Andrew Jackson declined to enforce the Supreme Court’s decision, thus allowing states to enact
further legislation damaging to the tribes.”).
60

61
See Winfield Scott, Orders No. [25]. Head Quarters, Eastern Division.
Cherokee Agency, Ten. May 17, 1838, https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/
rediscovery/09304_2005_001_a.jpg [https://perma.cc/FJ6R-3GQV]; William C. Canby, Jr.,
American Indian Law in a Nutshell 21 (7th ed. 2020) (“In the end . . . all but a few remnants
of tribes east of the Mississippi were moved to the West under a program that was voluntary in
name and coerced in fact.”); Trail of Tears, Hist. (July 7, 2020), https://www.history.com/topics/
native-american-history/trail-of-tears [https://perma.cc/FPX8-5ARD] (“In the winter of 1831,
under threat of invasion by the U.S. Army, the Choctaw became the first nation to be expelled from
its land altogether . . . . In 1836, the federal government drove the Creeks from their land for the
last time . . . . By 1838, only about 2,000 Cherokees had left their Georgia homeland for Indian
Territory. President Martin Van Buren sent General Winfield Scott and 7,000 soldiers to expedite
the removal process. Scott and his troops forced the Cherokee into stockades at bayonet point while
his men looted their homes and belongings. Then, they marched the Indians more than 1,200 miles
to Indian Territory.”).
62
Crepelle, Time Trap, supra note 58, at (manuscript at 11) (“By the 1850s, most ‘children
of the wilderness’ were placed on reservations.”).
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assimilate Indians into the United States.63 Congress hastened towards this objective
with the General Allotment Act (GAA) of 1887,64 which broke reservations into
160 acres parcels for each Indian head of household.65 Lands remaining after
Indians received their allotment were opened to white settlers.66
In 1891, Congress authorized mineral leases on Indian lands “not needed for
farming” but only if the Secretary of the Interior blessed the lease agreement.67
The Curtis Act of 1898 allotted the lands of the Oklahoma Indian Territory;68
however, it reserved subsurface mineral rights in allotted lands for the tribes.69
Despite reserving mineral ownership for tribes, the Curtis Act left “the leasing of
oil, coal, asphalt, and other minerals in said Territory, and all such leases” under
the Secretary of the Interior’s discretion.70 The Secretary’s continued control of
tribal resources led the Supreme Court to prohibit state taxes of Indian country
oil production in 1922.71 However, Congress authorized state taxation of oil and
gas on Indian lands in 192472 and 192773 because Congress intended to eliminate
tribal governments.74

63
See United States v. Clapox, 35 F. 575, 577 (D. Or. 1888) (“In fact, the reservation itself
is in the nature of a school, and the Indians are gathered there, under the charge of an agent, for
the purpose of acquiring the habits, ideas, and aspirations which distinguish the civilized from the
uncivilized man.”).
64
General Allotment Act of Feb. 8, 1887, Pub. L. No. 49-105, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388,
repealed by Indian Land Consolidation Act Amendments of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-462, 114 Stat.
1991 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 2201–2221).
65
Canby, supra note 61, at 25; Frank Pommersheim, Land into Trust: An Inquiry into Law,
Policy, and History, 49 Idaho L. Rev. 519, 521 (2013).
66
Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481, 496 (1973) (“Unallotted lands were made available to nonIndians with the purpose, in part, of promoting interaction between the races and of encouraging
Indians to adopt white ways.”); see also South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329, 335–36
(1998) (“Within a generation or two, it was thought, the tribes would dissolve, their reservations
would disappear, and individual Indians would be absorbed into the larger community of white
settlers.”); Pommersheim, supra note 65, at 521–22.
67

25 U.S.C. § 397 (2018).

68

An Act of June 28, 1898, ch. 517, 30 Stat. 495.

69

Id. § 11.

70

Id. § 13.

Gillespie v. Oklahoma, 257 U.S. 501, 506 (1922) (“The same considerations that
invalidate a tax upon the leases invalidate a tax upon the profits of the leases, and, stopping short
of theoretical possibilities, a tax upon such profits is a direct hamper upon the effort of the United
States to make the best terms that it can for its wards.”), overruled on other grounds by Helvering v.
Mountain Producers Corp., 303 U.S. 376 (1938).
71

72

25 U.S.C. § 398.

73

Id. § 398(c).

74

McGirt v. Oklahoma, 140 S. Ct. 2452, 2484–85 (2020) (Roberts, J., dissenting).
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Congress changed course in 1934 with the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA).75
The Act was intended to strengthen tribal governments76 and economies.77
Accordingly, the IRA ended allotment by placing reservation lands in perpetual
trust status.78 Although the IRA was well-intentioned,79 it is widely regarded as a
failure,80 largely because it granted the Secretary of the Interior extreme control
over reservation life.81 Oklahoma tribes were excluded from the IRA, but Congress
enacted similar legislation for Oklahoma tribes in 1936.82 To promote tribal selfgovernance and economic development,83 Congress passed the Indian Mineral
Leasing Act (IMLA) in 1938.84 The IMLA allowed tribes to enter mineral leases for
as long as “minerals are produced in paying quantities.”85 Ultimately, the IMLA did
little to further tribal self-governance because the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA)
controlled terms of the leases.86 And once a lease began, it was virtually impossible
for tribes to alter the terms of the agreement.87

See Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-383, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984
(codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 5101–5144); South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S.
329, 339–40 (1998) (“Although formally repudiated with the passage of the Indian Reorganization
Act in 1934, 48 Stat. 984, 25 U.S C. § 461, the policy favoring assimilation of Indian tribes through
the allotment of reservation land left behind a lasting legacy.”).
75

76

See Indian Reorganization Act §§ 1–2.

77

See id. §§ 10, 17.

78

Id. §§ 1–2.

79

See Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 152 (1973).

See Tim Giago, Good or Bad? Indian Reorganization Act Turns 75, HuffPost (May
25, 2011), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/good-or-bad-indian-reorga_b_284940 [https://
perma.cc/N3DK-SQWN]; Indian Reorganization Act (Indian New Deal), Colo. Encyc., https://
coloradoencyclopedia.org/article/indian-reorganization-act-indian-new-deal
[https://perma.cc/
R9VR-VEN3] (last visited Nov. 11, 2021).
80

81
Crepelle, Decolonizing Reservation Economies, supra note 20, at 439 (“The IRA inured little
benefit to tribal self-governance because the Secretary of the Interior was granted near tyrannical
power over all tribal activities.”).
82

See An Act of June 26, 1936, Pub. L. No. 74-816, ch. 831, 49 Stat. 1967.

Judith V. Royster, Mineral Development in Indian Country: The Evolution of Tribal Control
over Mineral Resources, 29 Tulsa L.J. 541, 558 (2013) [hereinafter Royster, Mineral Development].
83

Id.; Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938, ch. 198, 52 Stat. 347 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§
396a–396g).
84

85

25 U.S.C. § 396a (2018).

See Judith V. Royster, Practical Sovereignty, Political Sovereignty, and the Indian Tribal
Energy Development and Self-Determination Act, 12 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 1065, 1074 (2008)
[hereinafter Royster, Practical Sovereignty] (“Leasing was the sole route for mineral development by
non-Indians, and the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) set standard lease terms and developed standard
lease forms.”).
86

87
Id. at 1074 (“Mineral leases were essentially perpetual once minerals were produced
in paying quantities, preventing tribes from renegotiating more favorable terms as conditions
changed.”).
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The 1950s to 1970 was a rough period for tribes. The federal government
legislatively terminated over 100 tribes88 and relocated Indians from their
reservations to large cities.89 Furthermore, the Supreme Court held the federal
government could take tribal resources without providing tribes just compensation
in 1955.90 During the same year, Congress passed the Indian Long-Term Leasing
Act (ILTLA)91 to encourage “market forces” to chip away at tribal resources.92 Under
previous federal law, the maximum oil lease on Indian lands was ten years, and this
deterred investment in tribal lands.93 Accordingly, the ILTLA authorized leases of
Indian lands for natural resource development for a maximum period of twentyfive years with the option to renew for an additional twenty-five years.94 The leases
had to comply with regulations crafted by the Secretary of the Interior; likewise,
leases made under the act had to be approved by the Secretary of the Interior.95

88
See, e.g., H.R. Con. Res. 108, 83d Cong., 67 Stat. B132 (1953); Laurie Arnold,
Bartering With the Bones of Their Dead: The Colville Confederated Tribes and
Termination xi (2012) (“More than 100 tribes were terminated between 1953 and 1961 . . .
.”); Donald L. Fixico, Termination and Relocation: Federal Indian Policy, 1945–1960,
at 183 (1986) (“Between 1945 and 1960 the government processed 109 cases of termination
affecting 1,369,000 acres of Indian land . . . .”); Adam Crepelle, Standing Rock in the Swamp: Oil,
the Environment, and the United Houma Nation’s Struggle for Federal Recognition, 64 Loy. L. Rev.
141, 150–51 (2018) [hereinafter Crepelle, United Houma Nation’s Struggle] (“During this abysmal
era, the federal government terminated its relationship with over 100 tribes.”); Alysa Landry, Harry
S. Truman: Beginning of Indian Termination Era, Indian Country Today (Sept. 13, 2018), https://
indiancountrytoday.com/archive/harry-s-truman-beginning-of-indian-termination-era
[https://
perma.cc/NKA3-ND5E] (“Within the first decade of the termination era, policies that Truman
supported terminated more than 100 tribes, severing their trust relationships with the federal
government.”).
89
See Indian Relocation Act of 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-959, ch. 930, 70 Stat. 986; Crepelle,
United Houma Nation’s Struggle, supra note 88, at 151 (“Moreover, the termination era’s Urban Indian
Relocation Program bussed Indians from their rural reservations to major cities, making Indians
more visible to the American mainstream.”); 1952—Indian Relocation, Savages & Scoundrels,
http://savagesandscoundrels.org/flashpoints-conflicts/1952-indian-relocation/ [https://perma.cc/
G58B-B83Q] (“Typically, a reservation Indian was given a one-way bus or train ticket to a distant
urban center, usually a West Coast city, and told to check in with the local office of the BIA in order
to land a job, find lodging, and to start a new life.”).
90

See Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272 (1955).

91

Act of Aug. 9, 1955, ch. 615, 69 Stat. 539 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 396(a)).

Skull Valley Band of Goshute Indians v. Davis, 728 F. Supp. 2d 1287, 1305 n.30 (D.
Utah 2010) (“Congress’ ‘major purpose’ in enacting the ILTLA “was to increase Indian income
by opening Indian land to market forces and encouraging long-term leasing for commercial
purposes.””).
92

Id. (“Prior to Congress enacting that statute, Indians, with the Secretary of the Interior’s
approval, could only lease their land for short periods of time, usually no more than five or ten years
. . . . ‘Congress was concerned that [previously] restricted lease periods had discouraged lessees from
obtaining long-term construction financing and had thus foreclosed uses of land which required
substantial investment.’”).
93

94

25 U.S.C. § 415(a) (2018).

95

Id.
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Evidence of the federal government’s mismanagement of tribal resources began to
emerge during this period as well.96
The United States eschewed tribal termination in favor of tribal selfdetermination during the 1970s,97 and this policy continues to this day.98 In the
spirit of promoting tribal economic development and control over minerals,99
Congress passed the Indian Mineral Development Act of 1982 (IMDA).100 Towards
these ends, the IMDA authorizes tribes to actively engage in production rather
than merely passively lease their land.101 Thus, the IMDA allows each tribe to
make its own choice as to which mineral development arrangement is best given
its tolerance to risk and other factors.102 The IMDA ensures that tribes have access
to the information needed to negotiate mineral agreements.103 Although the IMDA
is definitely an improvement from the prior Indian country mineral regime,104
substantial levels of federally-imposed bureaucracy stand in the way of tribal selfdetermination and energy production.105 Indeed, the Secretary of the Interior has

96

See Royster, Mineral Development, supra note 83, at 567 n.166.

Special Message to the Congress on Indian Affairs, 1 Pub. Papers 564, 565–67 (July 8,
1970); Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-638, 88
Stat. 2203 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 5301–5423 (2018)); see also Landry, supra note
17 (“During his presidential campaign in 1976, Carter’s staff reached out to the National Congress
of American Indians and the National Tribal Chairmen’s Association. Carter met briefly with some
leaders and his staff drafted a position paper that endorsed Indian self-determination policy, already
in force.”).
97

98

See supra note 17 and accompanying text.

S. Rep. No. 114-149, at 3 (2015) (“The IMDA was a significant policy step in furtherance
of the broader Federal policy of Indian self-determination.”); S. Rep. No. 113-224, at 3 (2014)
(“The IMDA was specifically intended to provide Indian tribes both with a greater role and with
more flexibility in the mineral development process than is possible under the IMLA, by allowing
the Indian tribes themselves to negotiate and structure mineral agreements.”); Royster, Mineral
Development, supra note 83, at 584.
99

100
Indian Mineral Development Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-382, 96 Stat. 1938 (codified
as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 2101–2108).
101

25 U.S.C. § 2102(a) (2018).

Royster, Mineral Development, supra note 83 at 586 (“While the various types of mineral
agreements all offer increased tribal control over standard 1938 Act leases, they vary in the degree of
control, and consequently in the degree of risk.”).
102

103

25 U.S.C. § 2106.

104

Royster, Practical Sovereignty, supra note 86, at 1076–77.

Id. at 1077 (“Despite the substantial practical sovereignty embodied in the IMDA, that
statute, like all the leasing acts that preceded it, required the cumbersome process of secretarial
approval of each specific lease or agreement.”). See also 25 U.S.C. § 2103; S. Rep. No. 114-149, at
3 (2015) (“Most notably, the IMDA requires the Secretary to review a proposed IMDA agreement
between the Indian tribe and a third party and determine whether it is in the best interest of the
Indian tribe in light of several economic and non-economic factors.”); S. Rep. No. 113-224, at 3
(2014) (“Despite the greater flexibility and increased tribal involvement in negotiations that the
IMDA provides to Indian tribes, the Secretary of the Interior (Secretary) retains considerable control
over the process of finalizing any IMDA agreement.”).
105

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2022

13

Wyoming Law Review, Vol. 22 [2022], No. 1, Art. 2

38

Wyoming Law Review

Vol. 22

the authority to shut down Indian country oil development, and tribes have no
recourse against the Secretary’s decision.106
Congress attempted—but failed—to further release tribes from federal
oversight with the Indian Tribal Energy Development and Self-Determination
Act of 2005 (ITEDSDA).107 The ITEDSDA provides tribes technical and financial
support for energy production.108 Most significantly, the ITEDSDA allows tribes
to enter into Tribal Energy Resource Agreements (TERAs).109 TERAs are supposed
to empower tribes to control the energy production process with minimal federal
oversight;110 however, the Secretary of the Interior must first ensure the TERAs and
tribe meet several criteria.111 The criteria are so confounding that most folks did
not think tribes would be able to satisfy the requirements.112 In fact, the BIA itself
described the regulations accompanying TERAs as “hefty.”113 Congress responded

106
S. Rep. No. 114-149, at 4 (“In fact, it would appear that the Secretary has the authority to
cancel the agreement and fine an operator even if the Indian tribe were to oppose these measures.”).

25 U.S.C. §§ 3501–3506. See also S. Rep. No. 114-149, at 2 (“Title V of the Energy
Policy Act of 2005 was intended to address these concerns by removing much of the bureaucracy and
shifting the approval requirements for these transactions from the Secretary of the Interior to Indian
tribes.”); Tana Fitzpatrick, Cong. Rsch. Serv., R46446, Tribal Energy Resource Agreements
(TERAs): Approval Process and Selected Issues for Congress 1 (2020), https://sgp.fas.org/
crs/misc/R46446.pdf [https://perma.cc/A6CN-UHSB] [hereinafter Fitzpatrick, R46446] (“In
2005, Congress sought to increase tribal control of, and encourage tribal self-determination over,
Indian energy projects by enacting the Indian Tribal Energy Development and Self-Determination
Act”).
107

108

25 U.S.C. § 3502.

109

25 U.S.C. § 3504(e).

See Fitzpatrick, R46446, supra note 107, at 1 (“Under an approved TERA, tribes
could enter into leases, business agreements, or rights-of-way for the purpose of energy resource
development on tribal land without requiring the Secretary’s review and approval.”); Benjamin J.
Fosland, A Case of Not-So-Fatal Flaws: Re-Evaluating the Indian Tribal Energy and Self-Determination
Act, 48 Idaho L. Rev. 447, 452 (2012) (“The statute gives Indian tribes the ability to approve their
own energy leases almost completely without interference from the federal government.”).
110

111

clauses).

25 U.S.C. § 3504(e); S. Rep. No. 114-149, at 8 (stating TERAs have 16 mandatory

See S. Rep. No. 114-149, at 2 (“However, the implementation of Title V was more
burdensome than Congress intended.”); U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off., GAO-15-502, Indian
Energy Development: Poor Management by BIA Has Hindered Energy Development on
Indian Lands 33 (2015) [hereinafter GAO-15-502] (“Several stakeholders we interviewed stated
that the process to seek a TERA is complex, confusing, and time-consuming . . . .”); Fosland,
supra note 110, at 454 (“There has been no shortage of claims that Indian tribes will be unable to
take advantage of ITEDSA and enter into resource agreements because they do not have sufficient
money or expertise.”); Carla F. Fredericks, Plenary Energy, 118 W. Va. L. Rev. 789, 823 (2015)
(“[James M. Olguin] also identified several reasons for TERA’s failure, non-exhaustively citing too
much federal decision-making authority, inadequate funding made available to TERAs in light of
the fact that they ‘would be assuming duties and responsibilities typically carried out by the United
States,’ unclear standards for measuring tribal capacity, and a prohibitively cumbersome process for
obtaining TERA approval.”).
112

113
Tribal Energy Resource Agreements (TERAs), Indian Affs., U.S. Dep’t of the Interior,
https://www.bia.gov/as-ia/raca/regulations-development-andor-under-review/TERA
[https://

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol22/iss1/2
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol21/iss2/2

14
38

Crepelle: Finding Ways to Empower Tribal Oil Production

2022

Tribal Oil Production

39

to tribal concerns by amending the TERA legislation in 2017.114 Despite tribes
expressing interest, no tribe has attempted to navigate the TERA approval gauntlet
yet.115 Consequently, Indian country energy production remains just as riddled with
obstacles as it was before the ITEDSDA.116 The next Part explores these obstacles.

III. Obstacles to Indian Country Oil and Gas Development
Despite a policy of self-determination, tribes wishing to develop their natural
resources face significant federally-imposed barriers.117 Federal regulations make
attempting to drill for oil in Indian country more complicated than anywhere else
in the United States. Not only is the regulatory regime dense, bureaucratic faux pas
are common.118 Plus, businesses operating in Indian country are subject to higher
tax burdens than companies outside of Indian country. In the event legal trouble
arises, determining whether to file suit in state or tribal court can produce complex,
time consuming, and expensive litigation. The remainder of this Part explores these
uniquely Indian country obstacles.
A. Federal Bureaucracy
An intense federal regulatory scheme kills energy development in Indian
country.119 Indeed, energy companies openly state developing Indian country energy

perma.cc/9VGZ-87KC] (“The proposed changes aim to remove hefty regulatory requirements and
proposes to establish an alternative to TERA through a certification of Tribal Energy Development
Organization (TEDO).”).
114
Fitzpatrick, R46446, supra note 107, at 2 (“After consideration in several Congresses,
the Indian Tribal Energy Development and Self-Determination Act Amendments of 2017
(ITEDSA2017; P.L. 115-325) became law in December 2018.”). The Department of the Interior
followed Congress and amended their regulations for TERAs in 2019. See also Tribal Energy
Resource Agreements, 84 Fed. Reg. 69602 (Dec. 18, 2019) (codified at 25 C.FR. pt. 224).
115
Fitzpatrick, R46446, supra note 107, at 19 (“Because no tribe has yet entered into
a TERA, some policy issues that are not yet apparent may emerge and require congressional
consideration once the DOI processes its first complete TERA.”).
116
The Helping Expedite and Advance Responsible Tribal Homeownership Act of 2012
(HEARTH Act) does not apply to subsurface leasing. See Kronk Warner, supra note 32, at 1052.
Thus, the tribes that have implemented the HEARTH Act for land leasing remain bound by
standard Indian country subsurface regulations.
117
See Statement on Indian Policy, 1 Pub. Papers 96, 96 (Jan. 24, 1983) (“[S]ince 1975,
there has been more rhetoric than action. Instead of fostering and encouraging self-government,
federal policies have by and large inhibited the political and economic development of the tribes.”);
Regan & Anderson, Energy Wealth, supra note 8, at 11 (“The BIA and other federal agencies
oversee and approve all development agreements on Indian lands, adding burdensome layers of
regulations and bureaucracy to tribal resource development. Tribes must acquire approval from the
secretary of Interior for each specific lease or agreement, a process that is notoriously slow and
cumbersome.”).
118

See infra notes 144–150 and accompanying text.

See Volcovici, Privatize Oil-Rich Indian Reservations, supra note 43 (describing the federal
regulations relating to oil development in Indian country as “suffocating” and ‘far more burdensome
than those applied to private property.’).
119
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resources is the industry’s lowest priority.120 This is logical. No energy company
wants to jump through forty-nine regulatory hoops to drill for oil in Indian country
when the company can produce oil in four steps outside of Indian country.121 That’s
forty-five extra steps just because the land is Indian country.122 Moreover, these steps
have direct dollar costs.123 These costs are often more expensive inside than outside
of Indian country too. For example, a drilling permit in Indian country costs
$10,360,124 but the same permit costs about $100 in some states, like Montana.125
The federal regulatory process in Indian country is also costly in time. Obtaining
a land lease is usually a simple process outside of Indian country; however, inside
Indian country, the BIA can take over a year just to approve a land lease.126 Likewise,
acquiring a permit to drill for oil can take over two years in Indian country, but
this permit is usually acquired in less than two weeks outside of Indian country.127
While some delays are inevitable in an extensive regulatory process, many delays
result from BIA bureaucrats simply failing to do anything.128 Moreover, federal
reports find the BIA is understaffed, and its employees often lack the skills to
facilitate Indian country energy development.129

120
See Office of Inspector General, supra note 15, at 4 (“[T]he oil and gas industry
generally considers Indian leases to be their lowest priority, preferring to lease private, state, and
federally owned lands first.”).
121

Regan & Anderson, Energy Wealth of Indian Nations, supra note 18, at 208.

Kronk Warner, supra note 32, at 1042 (“The majority of these bureaucratic steps
are applicable only because the development project is in Indian country; they do not apply to
development occurring outside of Indian country”).
122

123
See GAO-15-502, supra note 112, at 26 (“According to an Interior report to Congress,
because Section 7 of the ESA applies to the development of Indian resources, Indian energy
development often requires costly surveys and other forms of data collection that are not always
required for projects on private lands.”).
124
See Statutorily Required Increase in Filing Fee for Processing Applications for Permit to Drill
(APDS) in Fiscal Year (FY) 2021, Bureau of Land Mgmt., https://www.blm.gov/policy/im-2020033 [https://perma.cc/A2FJ-94BX].

See GAO-15-502, supra note 112, at 26–27. See also Mont. Code Ann. § 82-11-134
(2019) (authorizing oil or gas well permit fees that range from $25-$150 in Montana).
125

The GAO Report on Indian Energy Development: Poor Management by BIA Has Hindered
Development on Indian Lands: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affs., 114th Cong. 31 (2015)
[hereinafter S. Hearing on GAO Report] (statement of Hon. Grant Stafne, Councilman, Fort Peck
Assiniboine and Sioux Tribes) (“As noted above, it can unfortunately take months and sometimes
even years for a successful bidder to secure BIA approval of a mineral lease.”); Kronk Warner,
supra note 32, at 1046 (“Under the existing scheme, it can take six months to two years for the
Department of the Interior to approve the lease of land in Indian country.”).
126

127

S. Rep. No. 113-224, at 2 (2014).

S. Hearing on GAO Report, supra note 126, at 29 (statement of Hon. Grant Stafne)
(“Federal inaction can often be as bad as wrong action, and we have found instances where the BIA
has simply failed to carry out its trust responsibility by waiting months, even years, to act on mineral
leases, appraisals, requests for drilling permits, and other documents requiring prompt action.”).
128

129

GAO-15-502, supra note 112, at 23–24 (referencing federal reports).
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The delays caused by bureaucrats and bureaucracy have real-world dollar costs.
When the BIA conducts bids for Indian country oil leases,130 the successful bidder
must deposit a quarter of the bid into a non-interest bearing account on the day
of the sale.131 The money remains in this account until the Secretary of the Interior
approves the lease,132 which can take over a year.133 Consequently, the bureaucratic
delays lead to diminished value through inflation.134 Bureaucratic delays also lead
to lost revenues. For example, the Southern Ute Indian Tribe waited over eight
years for the BIA to approve rights of way on the tribe’s reservation.135 This federal
administrative dawdle cost the Southern Ute Indian Tribe $95 million in lost
profits.136
Although the GAA was disavowed by Congress nearly a century ago,137 the
GAA’s impact on reservation land ownership continues to bedevil Indian country
energy production.138 Allotment resulted in Indian land ownership passing
down to multiple heirs.139 Over time, individual parcels of allotted land ended
up with multiple owners, sometimes hundreds.140 Thus, using allotted lands for
oil development requires obtaining the consent of multiple land owners,141 and
this makes fractionated land exceedingly difficult to use.142 Allotment generally

130
Id. at 15 (“If the resources are not already leased, BIA may advertise and conduct
competitive lease sales where operators can bid on nominated leases.”).
131
Bureau of Indian Affs., U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Fluid Mineral Estate:
Procedural Handbook 34 (2012), https://www.bia.gov/sites/bia_prod.opengov.ibmcloud.com/
files/assets/public/raca/handbook/pdf/idc-020740.pdf [https://perma.cc/2XTC-E2J9].

S. Hearing on GAO Report, supra note 122, at 31 (statement of Hon. Grant Stafne) (“Now,
the DOI holds bid deposits and other advance payments made by successful bidders in non-interestbearing federal accounts until the lease or contract is approved by the Secretary.”).
132

133

See supra notes 126–127 and accompanying text.

S. Hearing on GAO Rep., supra note 122, at 31 (statement of Hon. Grant Stafne) (“By
the time the funds are finally paid to tribes and individual Indian landowners, the value of the bid
deposit has been eroded by inflation.”).
134

135

GAO-15-502, supra note 112, at 22.

136

Id.

South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329, 357 (1998) (“The allotment era has
long since ended, and its guiding philosophy has been repudiated . . . . But despite the present-day
understanding of a ‘government-to-government relationship between the United States and each
Indian tribe,’ we must give effect to Congress’ intent in passing the 1894 Act.” (citation omitted)).
137

138
See Crepelle, Time Trap, supra note 58, at (manuscript at 25) (“The Court’s clinging to a
repudiated past means Indians will be forever haunted by the ghosts of allotment.”).
139
Babbitt v. Youpee, 519 U.S. 234, 238 (1997) (“As most owners had more than one heir,
interests in lands already allotted continued to splinter with each generation.”).
140
Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 707 (1987) (“Thus 40-, 80-, and 160-acre parcels became
splintered into multiple undivided interests in land, with some parcels having hundreds, and many
parcels having dozens, of owners.”).
141

25 C.F.R. § 162.012(a) (2021).

142

U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Land Buy Back Program for Tribal Nations:
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transferred subsurface minerals along with the ownership of the land; however,
some allotment acts reserved minerals for tribes while opening the surface to private
ownership.143 Divided surface and subsurface estates increase transaction costs by
requiring approvals of separate owners. Plus, different ownership frameworks
stemming from various allotment acts mean oil producers must spend extra time
and money examining the history of how each particular reservation was allotted.
The heaps of red tape, discussed above, hurt tribes. Despite federal control of
tribal resources and a mandate to promote tribal economic development through
oil production,144 courts do not always require federal bureaucrats to maximize
tribal profits.145 The federal bureaucrats overseeing tribal lands—according
to federal reports—are not always qualified to oversee oil production either.146
Inept bureaucrats plus an elaborate regulatory maze “makes transparency and
accountability difficult, if not impossible, to ensure.”147 In fact, federal bureaucrats
have outright “lost” and permitted the theft of billions of dollars in oil revenue
produced on tribal lands.148 Even the Secretary of the Interior’s overtly corrupt
behavior—which cost the Navajo Nation over $600 million—does not constitute

Initial Implementation Plan 6–7 (2012), https://www.doi.gov/sites/doi.gov/files/migrated/
buybackprogram/about/upload/Initial-Implementation-Plan-508_v2.pdf [https://perma.cc/94CCK3JU] (“As a result, highly-fractionated tracts lie idle, unable to be used for any economically
beneficial purpose or for direct use by tribal nations for the benefit of their members.”); Jessica
A. Shoemaker, Like Snow in the Spring Time: Allotment, Fractionation, and the Indian Land Tenure
Problem, 2003 Wis. L. Rev. 729, 731 (2003) (“Fractionation prevents efficient use of property,
impedes individual and community economic development, and fundamentally bars realization of
successful tribal self-determination and self-governance–the promotion of which is said to be the
current national goal.”).
Royster, Mineral Development, supra 83, at 549 (“Thus, when land was allotted under
the General Allotment Act, the mineral rights as well as the surface rights belonged to the allottee,
subject to the same trust status as the land. Nonetheless, Congress could, and sometimes did,
provide otherwise in a specific allotment act. In some instances, the mineral estate of allotted lands
was expressly reserved to the tribe.”).
143

144
See United States v. Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. 488, 516 (2003) (Souter, J., dissenting)
(“The ‘basic purpose’ of the Secretary’s powers under IMLA is thus to ‘maximize tribal revenues from
reservation lands.’”).
145
Shoshone Indian Tribe of the Wind River Rsrv. v. United States, 56 Fed. Cl. 639 (2003)
(holding that the federal government had no fiduciary duty to maximize oil and gas revenue from
production of oil and gas on Indian lands).

See GAO-15-502, supra note 112, at 23 (“Some BIA regional and agency offices do not
have staff with the skills needed to effectively evaluate energy-related documents or adequate staff
resources, according to a few stakeholders we interviewed and some of the literature we reviewed.”).
146

147

Grogan et al., supra note 18, at 18.

S. Rep. No. 101-216, at 105 (1989) (“The Department of the Interior and its relevant
agencies, charged with stewardship of federal and Indian land, have knowingly allowed this
widespread oil theft to go undetected for decades, at the direct expense of Indian owners.”); see
also Melinda Janko, Elouise Cobell: A Small Measure of Justice, Nat’l Museum of the Am. Indian,
Summer 2013, at 26, https://www.americanindianmagazine.org/story/elouise-cobell-smallmeasure-justice [https://perma.cc/2PAZ-SCY4].
148
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a breach of the trust relationship according to the Supreme Court.149 Tribes cannot
even compel the United States to produce the documents needed to verify if the
United States has mismanaged tribal resources.150
B. Dual Taxation
Dual taxation occurs when two sovereigns tax the same transaction.151 Tribes
are sovereigns and have authority to tax all people who set foot on their land.152 As
a bright line rule, states cannot tax tribes.153 Likewise, individual Indians are exempt
from all state taxes when on their tribe’s reservation.154 On reservations, states can
only levy taxes on a tribe or its citizens with express congressional authorization.155
However, states may be able to tax individuals other than the tribe’s own citizens
in Indian country.156 The legality of the state tax turns on whether it burdens

See United States v. Navajo Nation, 556 U.S. 287 (2009); Bill Donovan, Case Closed:
U.S. Supreme Court Kills Bid to Hold Interior Accountable for Coal Royalty Deceit, Navajo Times
(Apr. 9, 2009), https://www.navajotimes.come/news/2009/0409/040909coal.php [https://perma.
cc/U2Z8-ZZDR] (“Hodel had been warned by the department solicitor against taking sides in the
issue, but on July 17, 1985, he signed a memo—drafted by Peabody—directing the suppression of
the department’s decision in favor of a 20 percent royalty rate, and the technical studies supporting
it. Hodel also assumed personal jurisdiction over the matter and directed the Navajos, who were
unaware of how close Interior had been to approving a 20 percent royalty rate, to negotiate with
Peabody. The result was a royalty rate of 12.5 percent and a large number of concessions by the tribe.
The revised lease allowed a review of royalty rates every 10 years, and the tribe began the process in
1997, asking the Interior Department for background information. Buried within the case file were
the documents revealing Hodel’s role as saboteur.”); Marley Shebala, Lawsuits Shed Light on Peabody’s
Clout, Navajo Times (Aug. 29, 2011), https://navajotimes.com/news/2011/0811/082911peabody2.
php [https://perma.cc/8TAX-UHXQ]. For a comprehensive telling by the United States Supreme
Court of the illegal behavior by Secretary of the Interior, Donald Hodel, see United States v. Navajo
Nation, 537 U.S. 488, 520 (2003) (Souter, J., dissenting).
149

150

See United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 564 U.S. 162 (2011).

151

Double taxation, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).

See Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 137 (1982) (“The power to tax is an
essential attribute of Indian sovereignty because it is a necessary instrument of self-government and
territorial management.”).
152

State and Federal Tax Policy: Building New Markets in Indian Country: Hearing Before the
S. Comm. on Indian Affs., 112th Cong. 14 (2011) [hereinafter S. Hearing on State and Federal Tax
Policy] (statement of Steven J. Gunn, Att’y & Prof. of Law (Adjunct), Wash. U. St. Louis) (“In the
area of taxation, the Supreme Court has adopted a categorical rule. States may not tax Indian tribes
or their members, absent Congressional authorization.”).
153

154
Id. (“Indian tribes and individuals generally are exempt from state taxation within their
own territories.”).
155
Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148 (1973) (“[I]n the special area of state
taxation, absent cession of jurisdiction or other federal statutes permitting it, there has been no
satisfactory authority for taxing Indian reservation lands or Indian income from activities carried on
within the boundaries of the reservation, and McClanahan v. State Tax Commission of Arizona lays to
rest any doubt in this respect by holding that such taxation is not permissible absent congressional
consent.” (citation omitted)).

S. Hearing on State and Federal Tax Policy, supra note 153, at 14 (statement of Steven J.
Gunn) (“State taxation of nonmembers in Indian country is not categorically barred.”).
156
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the federal government’s interest in promoting tribal self-government.157 While
state taxes have been preempted,158 this is rare.159 State taxation cripples Indian
country oil and gas development because this results in dual taxation of private
oil companies.160
Cotton Petroleum Corporation v. New Mexico is the hallmark case on state
taxation of Indian country in general and Indian energy production in particular.161
The case arose because both the Jicarilla Apache Tribe and the State of New Mexico
levied a tax on private oil companies operating on the tribe’s reservation.162 Cotton
argued New Mexico’s taxes contravened the United States policy of promoting
tribal self-determination and economic development.163 Cotton also challenged
the constitutionality of the tax by arguing the tax was completely disproportional
to the services provided by the state.164 On this point, there was no controversy:
Cotton paid $2,293,953 in state taxes for on reservation oil production but received
a mere $89,384 in services from New Mexico.165

See White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 145 (1980) (“This inquiry is
not dependent on mechanical or absolute conceptions of state or tribal sovereignty, but has called for
a particularized inquiry into the nature of the state, federal, and tribal interests at stake, an inquiry
designed to determine whether, in the specific context, the exercise of state authority would violate
federal law.”).
157

158
See id. at 148 (“In these circumstances we agree with petitioners that the federal
regulatory scheme is so pervasive as to preclude the additional burdens sought to be imposed in
this case.”); New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 338 (1983) (“Furthermore,
the exercise of concurrent state jurisdiction in this case would completely ‘disturb and disarrange’
the comprehensive scheme of federal and tribal management established pursuant to federal law.”
(citation omitted)); Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd. v. Bureau of Revenue, 458 U.S. 832, 841–42 (1982)
(“The direction and supervision provided by the Federal Government for the construction of Indian
schools leave no room for the additional burden sought to be imposed by the State through its
taxation of the gross receipts paid to Lembke by the Board.”).
159
Adam Crepelle, Taxes, Theft, and Indian Tribes: Seeking an Equitable Solution to State
Taxation of Indian Country Commerce, 122 W. Va. L. Rev. 999, 1007–09 (2020) [hereinafter
Crepelle, Seeking an Equitable Solution].
160
See id. at 1000 (“Several factors contribute to Indian country’s economic despair, but state
taxation of Indian country commerce is the most severe impediment to tribal economies.”).

490 U.S. 163 (1989); Erin M. Erhardt, States Versus Tribes: The Problem of Multiple
Taxation of Non-Indian Oil and Gas Leases on Indian Reservations, 38 Am. Indian L. Rev. 533,
539 (2014) (“Cotton represents a major turning point for state taxation of non-Indians on Indian
lands.”).
161

162

Cotton, 490 U.S. at 170.

Id. at 177 (“Cotton concludes that the New Mexico taxes unduly interfere with the
federal interest in promoting tribal economic self-sufficiency and are not justified by an adequate
state interest.”).
163

164

Id. at 170.

Id. at 207 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“Indeed, the majority appears to accept the fact
that the state taxes are vastly disproportionate as well it must: $89,384 in services, as compared with
$2,293,953 in taxes, speaks for itself.” (citation omitted).
165
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The Supreme Court rejected both of Cotton’s arguments. The Court did not
believe a statute designed to maximize tribal profits from oil produced on tribal
lands invalidated state taxes.166 The Court acknowledged reservation oil production
is almost entirely controlled by the federal government and the tribe;167 however,
the state provided some services on the reservation.168 Although the Court admitted
the taxes New Mexico levied “far exceeded the value of services provided by the
State to the lessees, or more generally to the reservation as a whole,”169 the Court
rejected any proportionality requirement between the state tax and the value of
state services delivered to the tribe.170 Moreover, the Court asserted extra taxes on
tribal oil production have only “indirect” and “insubstantial” impacts on the ability
of tribes to generate oil revenue.171 The Court even claimed, “there is simply no
evidence in the record that the tax has had an adverse effect on the Tribe’s ability
to attract oil and gas lessees.”172
State taxes of tribal oil production present tribes with a unique taxation
conundrum.173 If the tribe levies a tax upon reservation oil producers, the tribal
tax plus the state tax equals higher costs to operate on reservations.174 Despite the
Supreme Court’s assertion in Cotton, extra taxes have an obvious and adverse impact
on reservation oil production175—as dual taxation would in any jurisdiction.176 The

166

Id. at 179–80 (majority opinion).

Id. at 186 (“Thus, although the federal and tribal regulations in this case are extensive,
they are not exclusive, as were the regulations in Bracker and Ramah Navajo School Bd.”).
167

168

Id. at 185–86.

169

Id. at 189.

See id. at 190 (“[T[here is no constitutional requirement that the benefits received from a
taxing authority by an ordinary commercial taxpayer—or by those living in the community where
the taxpayer is located—must equal the amount of its tax obligations.”).
170

171

Id. at 186–87.

172

Id. at 191.

See Royster, Mineral Development, supra note 83, at 600 (“Dual taxation forces tribes
into a choice of intolerable alternatives: to impose a tribal tax on top of a state tax and thus reduce
the market value of tribal minerals, or to forego a tribal tax and thus lose both the revenue and the
regulatory control that a tax affords.”).
173

174
See id. at 611 (“To the extent that companies continue to develop tribal minerals, dual
taxation will result in higher market prices for tribal resources, decreasing their marketability.”).
175
S. Hearing on State and Federal Tax Policy, supra note 153, at 10 (“If the Tribe desires to
impose a tax or a fee in order to defray its costs and the activity is already taxed by the state or the
United States, then the contactors paying the taxes are exposed to higher taxation then they would
experience off the Reservation, thus making on Reservation [sic] work much less attractive.”); see
also Valerie Volcovici, Native American Tribes Decry State Taxation of Reservation Energy, Reuters
(Jan. 26, 2017, 10:01 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/usa-trump-tribes-tax/native-americantribes-decry-state-taxation-of-reservation-energy-projects-idUSL5N1FG6EW [https://perma.cc/
GKZ6-YM7P] [hereinafter Volcovici, Tribes Decry State Taxation] (“Additional state taxes drives
away company investment and economic development, tribal leaders told Reuters.”).
176
See Crepelle, Seeking an Equitable Solution, supra note 159, at 1014 (noting states use
lower tax rates to entice businesses to operate in their borders).
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Court’s disregard for reality is all the more perplexing because it cited a brief by oil
companies177 explaining how state taxes harm tribal energy production.178 Thus,
state taxes prevent tribes from collecting taxes on the oil extracted within tribal
borders.179 This forces tribes to accommodate state taxes while trying to establish
their tax and lease rates.180
If tribes choose not to tax, tribes lack the revenue stream needed to function
as governments.181 The de facto inability to tax results in Indian country lacking
the basic physical infrastructure needed for economic development because
governments need tax revenue to provide government services and infrastructure.182
States collect heaps of tax dollars from Indian country oil producers but choose to
spend the money outside of Indian country.183 Consequently, tribes receive little to
no benefit from the tax revenue states take from tribal lands.184 For example, North
Dakota collected over $80 million in taxes from energy production on the Fort
Berthold Reservation, home to the Mandan, Hidatsa, and Arikara Nation (MHA),
in 2011.185 The high volume of road traffic resulting from the energy production

177

Cotton, 490 U.S. at 187 n.18 (1989).

Amici Curiae Brief of Texaco Inc. et al. in Support of Appellants at 4, Cotton, 490 U.S.
163 (No. 87-1327) (“[T]he combined tribal and state taxes will prevent the development of tribal
resources that otherwise would be sold to consumers nationwide.”).
178

179
See Royster, Mineral Development, supra note 83, at 611 (“The dual tax burden renders
tribal mineral development considerably less attractive than development of off-reservation minerals,
reducing the value of the mineral resource.”).
180
See, e.g., Ute Mountain Ute Tribe v. Homans, 775 F. Supp. 2d 1259, 1274 (D.N.M.
2009) (“To the extent that they can do so without making other operators more attractive to the
UMUT, the operators who negotiate leases and agreements with the UMUT take into account the
cost of the five New Mexico taxes in reaching terms with the UMUT.”).
181
See Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Navajo Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 195, 201 (1985); Merrion
v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 138 n.5 (1982) (“[I]t simply does not make sense to expect
the tribes to carry out municipal functions approved and mandated by Congress without being able
to exercise at least minimal taxing powers, whether they take the form of real estate taxes, leasehold
taxes or severance taxes.” (quoting Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 617 F.2d 537, 550 (10th Cir.
1980))).
182
See U.S. Comm’n on C.R., Broken Promises: Continuing Federal Funding
Shortfall for Native Americans 165 (2018), https://www.usccr.gov/pubs/2018/12-20-BrokenPromises.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZZ74-AR9Z].
183
Volcovici, Tribes Decry State Taxation, supra note 175 (“Tribes including the Mandan,
Hidatsa and Arikara (MHA) Nation in North Dakota’s Bakken oil fields and the Navajo Nation in
the U.S. Southwest said hundreds of millions of dollars in tax revenues on their energy production
goes to the states in which their reservations are located - with the tribes getting few state services in
return.”).

Ute Mountain Ute Tribe v. Rodriguez, 660 F.3d 1177, 1199 (10th Cir. 2011) (“However,
because the evidence demonstrated that these services were rarely, if ever, utilized by the oil and gas
operators or the Tribe in connection with the on-reservation activity, the district court found that
these services only were offered ‘in theory’ and only provided a ‘de minimis’ benefit.”).
184

Kelly S. Croman & Jonathan B. Taylor, Why Beggar Thy Indian Neighbor? The
Case For Tribal Primacy in Taxation in Indian Country 19 (2016), http://nni.arizona.edu/
185
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strained the reservation’s roadways; nonetheless, North Dakota spent less than $2
million on the tribe’s roads.186 The cost to build one mile of road is $1.5 million.187
Without roads, tribes will not be able to effectively develop their economies.188
The MHA eventually solved their tax problem by entering a compact with
North Dakota.189 The Fort Berthold Reservation is allotted, a checkerboard of fee
and trust lands,190 and the tax compact reflects this land arrangement. Under the
compact, the tribe keeps eighty percent of the tax revenue collected on trust land
within the reservation while the state gets twenty percent.191 On fee lands within
the reservation, the state gets eighty percent and the tribe gets twenty percent.192
Negotiating tax compacts is an assertion of sovereignty.193 However, being forced
to negotiate a compact is not sovereignty, and the current status of federal Indian
law tax jurisprudence compels tribes to compact.194 During negotiations, states
have all the power because they do not have to negotiate with tribes in order to tax
activities on tribal land.195 This can coerce tribes into bad bargains.

application/files/8914/6254/9090/2016_Croman_why_beggar_thy_Indian_neighbor.pdf [https://
perma.cc/82UJ-LX68].
186

Id.

Erica Beacom, Gas, Roads, and Glory: North Dakota and MHA Nation’s Struggle over
Flaring Regulation, 40 Wm. & Mary Env’t L. & Pol’y Rev. 235, 258 (2015).
187

188
Special Message to the Congress on the Problems of the American Indian: “The Forgotten
American”, 1 Pub. Papers 335, 341 (Mar. 6, 1968) (“Without an adequate system of roads to link
Indian areas with the rest of our Nation, community and economic development, Indian self-help
programs, and even education cannot go forward as rapidly as they should.”).
189
Burgum Signs Bill to Share Tax Revenue with MHA Nation from Oil Wells Straddling
Reservation Boundary, N.D. Off. of the Governor (Apr. 28, 2021, 4:45 PM), https://www.
governor.nd.gov/news/burgum-signs-bill-share-tax-revenue-mha-nation-oil-wells-straddlingreservation-boundary [https://perma.cc/6PBN-PY5B] [hereinafter Burgum Signs Bill].
190
Mandan, Hidatsa, & Arikara Nation, Tribal Bus. Council, Comment Letter on Draft
Class II UIC Permit No. ND22349-11250 for Red Murphy SWD No. 1, to Craig Boomgaard, Env’t
Prot. Agency 5 (July 16, 2018) https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2018-07/documents/
mha_cmts_red_murphy_swd_no_1_wattch_7_16_18_0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/QUQ4-TV9E]
(“As a result of disastrous federal allotment policies in the late 1800’s and early 1900’s the MHA
Nation’s Reservation is a checkerboard of fee, allottee and trust lands.”).
191

Burgum Signs Bill, supra note 189.

192

Id.

See Lance Morgan, The Rise of Tribes and the Fall of Federal Indian Law, 49 Ariz. St. L.J.
115, 120 (2017) (“Tribes cut a deal and enter into a compact to bypass the restrictions to establish
a new economic and legal equilibrium . . . .”).
193

194
See Jerry Cornfield, Deal Ends Legal Fight and Allows Tulalips a Cut of Sales Tax,
HeraldNet (Jan. 29, 2020, 9:13 PM), https://www.heraldnet.com/news/deal-ends-legal-fightand-allows-tulalips-a-cut-of-sales-tax/ [https://perma.cc/6AEK-Q5X5] (“‘For 20-plus years, the
Tribe has attempted to get both the State and County to enter into a tax compact to share some
of the tax revenues generated within Quil Ceda Village,’ [Tulalip Tribal Board Chairwoman Teri
Gobin] wrote. ‘To date, we have never received a dollar, yet we have been 100% responsible for the
costs of all the infrastructure and governmental services that allow those businesses to operate.’”).
195

See Crepelle, Seeking an Equitable Solution, supra note 159, at 1026 (“Barring state
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C. Jurisdictional Uncertainty
Jurisdictional uncertainty has long been identified as an obstacle to Indian
country economic development.196 Ambiguity over tribal civil jurisdiction arose in
the 1981 case of Montana v. United States wherein the Court stated, “[T]he general
proposition that the inherent sovereign powers of an Indian tribe do not extend to
the activities of nonmembers of the tribe.”197 The Court went on to set forth two
bases for tribal civil jurisdiction over non-Indians. Tribes can assert civil jurisdiction
over non-Indians who enter consensual relations with the tribe or its citizens.198
Tribes can also assert civil jurisdiction over non-Indians engaged in conduct that
imperils the political integrity or general welfare of the tribe.199 Both exceptions
have been construed extremely narrowly;200 however, Montana was specifically about
tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians on fee lands within a reservation.201 Although
the Supreme Court issued an opinion applying Montana to a case arising on trust
land,202 this contradicts other precedent indicating tribes possess inherent civil
jurisdiction over non-Indians on trust lands.203

taxation as a baseline simply levels the bargaining power between tribes and states.”); Morgan, supra
note 193, at 123 (“The states can usually impose their will indirectly on tribes, ignoring conflicting
tribal taxation laws because the states control the tribe’s access to the stream of commerce.”).
See generally Presidential Comm’n on Indian Rsrv. Econs., Rep. & Recommendations
to the President of the U.S. (Nov. 30, 1984), https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED252342.pdf
[https://perma.cc/W4UP-FCAV].
196

197

Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565 (1981).

198

Id.

199

Id. at 566.

See Plains Com. Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316, 333 (2008)
(“Tellingly, with only ‘one minor exception, we have never upheld under Montana the extension
of tribal civil authority over nonmembers on non-Indian land.’ The exception is Brendale v.
Confederated Tribes and Bands of Yakima Nation, and even it fits the general rubric noted above:
In that case, we permitted a Tribe to restrain particular uses of non-Indian fee land through zoning
regulations.” (citations omitted)); Dolgencorp, Inc., v. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians, 732
F.3d 409, 419 (5th Cir. 2013) (Smith, J., dissenting) (“The majority’s alarming and unprecedented
holding far outpaces the Supreme Court, which has never upheld Indian jurisdiction over a
nonmember defendant.”), opinion withdrawn and superseded by Dolgencorp, Inc. v. Mississippi Ban
of Choctaw Indians, 746 F.3d 167 (5th Cir. 2014); Crepelle, Business Development, supra note 31,
at 709 (“This unnaturally narrow construction of consensual relations transforms what should be
a straightforward basis for tribal court jurisdiction into a roll of the dice.”); Robert B. Porter, The
Meaning of Indigenous Nation Sovereignty, 34 Ariz. St. L.J. 75, 84–85 (2002) (“While the Court
has crafted two exceptions by which Indian nation authority might be exercised over non- Indiansexceptions that never seem to apply . . . .”).
200

Montana, 450 U.S. at 547 (“This case concerns the sources and scope of the power of an
Indian tribe to regulate hunting and fishing by non-Indians on lands within its reservation owned
in fee simple by non-Indians.”).
201

202

Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 359–60 (2001).

See Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408,
455 (1989) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“With respect to Montana’s
‘general principle’ creating a presumption against tribal civil jurisdiction over non-Indians absent
express congressional delegation, I find it evident that the Court simply missed its usual way.”);
Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 18 (1987) (“Tribal authority over the activities of
203

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol22/iss1/2
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Ambiguity over tribal jurisdiction results in frequent jurisdictional challenges
by non-Indians.204 Non-Indians have a federal common law right to challenge
tribal jurisdiction.205 In order to contest tribal jurisdiction in federal court, nonIndians must first exhaust their tribal court remedies.206 Tribal justice systems often
have appellate courts, and the federal judiciary is tiered as well.207 Consequently,
parties can spend years merely debating where to sue.208 Since the scope of tribal
court jurisdiction over non-Indians is a question of subject matter jurisdiction
rather than personal jurisdiction, it is unclear whether forum selection clauses can
circumvent the jurisdictional charade.209 The ability of arbitration agreements to
avoid this hullaballoo is also unclear.210 Even basic procedural issues and enforcing
judgements can become tricky when Indian country is involved.211 The potential

non-Indians on reservation lands is an important part of tribal sovereignty. Civil jurisdiction over
such activities presumptively lies in the tribal courts unless affirmatively limited by a specific treaty
provision or federal statute.”); Nat’l Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S.
845, 855 n.17 (1985); Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 65 (1978) (“Tribal courts have
repeatedly been recognized as appropriate forums for the exclusive adjudication of disputes affecting
important personal and property interests of both Indians and non-Indians.”); Water Wheel Camp
Rec. Area, Inc. v. LaRance, 642 F.3d 802, 810 (9th Cir. 2011) (“Montana limited the tribe’s ability
to exercise its power to exclude only as applied to the regulation of non-Indians on non-Indian land,
not on tribal land.”).
204
Canby, supra note 61, at 259 (“Frequently, when a nonmember (usually a non-Indian)
is sued in tribal court, he or she will bring an action in federal court either to challenge the tribal
court’s jurisdiction or to attempt to litigate the underlying dispute in federal court.”); Crepelle,
Business Development, supra note 31, at 707–08; Sarah Krakoff, Tribal Civil Judicial Jurisdiction over
Nonmembers: A Practical Guide for Judges, 81 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1187, 1191 (2010) (“Nonmember
defendants challenge even seemingly clear examples of legitimate tribal jurisdiction.”).
205
See Nat’l Farmers Union Ins. Cos., 471 U.S. at 852–53 (holding that non-Indians
challenging tribal court’s power to exercise civil subject-matter jurisdiction had an action “arising
under” federal law within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1331).
206
Id. at 857 (requiring an exhaustion of Tribal court remedies before challenging jurisdiction
in federal court); Iowa Mut. Ins. Co., 480 U.S. at 16 (ruling that federal courts cannot exercise
diversity jurisdiction until a tribal court has had a chance to decide its own jurisdiction first).

Crepelle, Business Development, supra note 31, at 708 (“Tribes often have tiered judicial
systems . . . .”).
207

208
See Krakoff, supra note 204, at 1191 (noting jurisdictional challenges “result[] in delay,
multiplication of expenses, and insecurity for the parties seeking relief in their chosen forum”);
Joel Pruett, Nothing Personal (or Subject Matter) About It: Jurisdictional Risk as an Impetus for NonTribal Opt-Outs from Tribal Economies, and the Need for Administrative Response, 40 Am. Indian L.
Rev. 131, 131–32 (2016) (“[T]he tribal exhaustion doctrine also imposes on potential non-tribal
litigants the threat of expending substantial ‘time, money and effort litigating . . . in . . . Tribal Court’
before ‘seeking to terminate the tribal court actions against them’ in federal court.’”). Becker v. Ute
Indian Tribe of Uintah & Ouray Rsrv., 11 F.4th 1140, 1142 (10th Cir. 2021) (“The dispute between
Becker and the Tribe regarding the Agreement has spawned five separate lawsuits in three separate
court systems.”).
209
For a discussion of how forum selection clauses and arbitration agreements work in
Indian country, see Crepelle, Business Development, supra note 31, at 712–15.
210

Id. at 714–15.

211

Id. at 715–16.
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for jurisdictional conflicts to arise adds uncertainty and makes Indian country a
less attractive venue to produce energy.

IV. Recommendations
Federal Indian law is the obstacle to tribal oil production. As Congress noted
thirty years ago, the United States “has never fully rejected the paternalism of
the 19th century, the United States government maintains a stifling bureaucratic
presence in Indian country, and fails to deal with tribal governments as responsible
partners in our federalist system.”212 Likewise, Lance Morgan, CEO of the highly
successful, tribally-owned Ho-Chunk, Inc., says of federal Indian law: “The system
of restrictions is so deep and so pervasive that it really cannot be fixed. If you want
to get something done, Federal Indian law simply has to be ignored on occasion.”213
President Donald Trump shared Morgan’s view and told tribal leaders to ignore the
federal regulations standing in the way of oil production:
[W]hat are they going to do? Once you get it out of the ground are
they going to make you put it back in there? I mean, once it’s out of the
ground it can’t go back in there. You’ve just got to do it. I’m telling you,
chief, you’ve just got to do it.214
Rather than ignoring the law, this Part seeks ways to eliminate the constraints of
federal Indian law within the existing legal framework.
This Part presents three possibilities. A little explored option within the ITEDSDA
is Tribal Energy Development Organizations (TEDO). By creating a TEDO, tribes
can streamline some of the federal regulatory processes. But not all of the peculiar
bureaucratic procedural options standing in the way of tribal oil production can be
streamlined; thus, tribes should challenge the constitutionality of the federal energy
regulations that apply only to tribes. Laws must pass a rationality standard to survive
constitutional scrutiny, and most of the regulations that apply only to tribes do not
meet this threshold. Another way to eliminate the inefficiencies created by federal
red tape is technology. Jurisdictions around the world are turning to blockchain and
related technologies to improve their bureaucracies. Tribes should urge the BIA to
consider this possibility. The remainder of this Part explores these options.
A.TEDO and Vertical Integration
While TERAs have received significant attention,215 the 2017 ITEDSDA

212

S. Rep. No. 101-216, at 5 (1989).

213

Morgan, supra note 193, at 119.

Jonathan Swan, Trump’s Government of One, Axios (Nov. 5, 2017), https://www.axios.
com/trumps-government-of-one-2506850819.html [https://perma.cc/9GVB-FM7E].
214

215
See The GAO Report on Indian Energy Development: Poor Management by BIA has
Hindered Development on Indian Lands: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affs., 114th Cong.
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authorizes the creation of Tribal Energy Development Organizations (TEDOs).216
TEDOs have been largely ignored in scholarship;217 nevertheless, TEDOs have
tremendous potential to increase Indian country energy production.218 A TEDO is
a wholly tribally-owned business entity engaged in energy production.219 A TEDO
can also be a combination of one tribally-owned enterprise and other enterprises.220
TEDOs have the ability to enter leases, business agreements, and issue rightsof-way without the Secretary of the Interior’s approval.221 By cutting the federal
government out of the approval process, TEDOs allow tribes to bypass bureaucratic
delays triggered by federal actions.222
Compared to acquiring TERA certification, obtaining a TEDO is a
straightforward process.223 TEDO certification requires the TEDO to be formed
under tribal law,224 and the tribe whose land is being developed must own and
control a majority interest in the TEDO.225 Additionally, the TEDO organizing
documents must contain a statement declaring the TEDO “shall be subject to
the jurisdiction, laws, and authority of the Indian tribe.”226 The tribe pursuing
the TEDO also must have successfully carried out a federal-tribal self-governance
contract227 relating to tribal land management for at least three consecutive years
preceding the TEDO certification application.228 Within ninety days of receiving

17 (2015) (statement of Frank Rusco, Director, Nat. Res. & Env’t, U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off.);
Fitzpatrick, R46446, supra note 107, at 1–3.
216

25 U.S.C. § 3504(h) (2018).

A Westlaw secondary source search of “tribal energy development organization” yielded
eight results on December 21, 2021.
217

218
See Fredericks, supra note 112, at 822 (“[T]his bill supplies a great deal of autonomy to
certified TEDOs in building a foundation for tribal energy resource development and continuing to
grow from that point.”).
219

25 U.S.C. § 3501(12)(A).

220

Id. § 3501(12)(B).

221

Id. § 3504(a)(2)(A)(ii), (b)(2)(B); 25 C.F.R. § 224.200 (2021).

See Bureau of Indian Affs., U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Transcript of Tribal
Energy Resource Agreement (TERA) Consultation 37–38 (July 11, 2019), https://www.bia.
gov/sites/bia.gov/files/assets/as-ia/raca/pdf/7-11-19_Transcript_Catoosa-OK_508.pdf
[https://
perma.cc/RED5-E2Z9] [hereinafter Transcript of TERA Consultation].
222

223
Compare 25 C.F.R. §§ 224.50–224.185 (TERA regulations), with 25 C.F.R. §§ 224.200–
224.206 (TEDO regulations).
224

25 U.S.C. § 3504(2)(h)(B)(i).

225

Id. § 3504(2)(h)(B)(ii–iii).

226

Id. § 3504(2)(h)(B)(iv).

Id. § 3504(j). For a general discussion of self-determination contracts, see Geoffrey D.
Strommer & Stephen D. Osborne, The History, Status, and Future of Tribal Self-Governance Under
the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act, 39 Am. Indian L. Rev. 1 (2014).
227

228

25 U.S.C. § 3504(h)(2)(A).
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a TEDO application,229 the Secretary must approve TEDOs satisfying the
aforementioned criteria.230
TEDOs enable tribes to partner with other tribes and entities, but vertically
integrating231 energy production to the fullest extent possible maximizes tribal
sovereignty and revenues. First of all, states cannot tax tribes or their corporations.232
Thus, dual taxation is not an issue if the TEDO is owned by a single tribe because
states cannot tax tribes or corporations that are arms of the tribe. Jurisdictional issues
are also much simpler when the tribe is the exclusive owner,233 and jurisdictional
clarity decreases uncertainty thereby reducing operating costs. Moreover, the federal
government is much less involved when a tribe develops its own resources than
when a third-party develops tribal resources.234 Some tribes have already formed
their own energy companies, including the Navajo Nation235 and Southern Ute
Indian Tribe.236 Combining vertical integration with a TEDO maximizes tribal
sovereignty in energy production.
Forming a TEDO improves tribes’ ability to effectively engage in energy
production but does not solve all tribal energy production difficulties. A TEDO
does not remove all federal bureaucracy. Even if tribes assume certain functions
from the federal government through self-governance contracts,237 tribes will
likely be bound by federal approvals because the tribe is acting in lieu of the
federal government.238 However, TEDOs are as good it gets for tribes in the
current legal landscape.

229

Id. § 3504(h)(1).

230

Id. § 3504(h)(2); 25 C.F.R. 224.204 (2021).

Adam Hayes, Vertical Integration, Investopedia (Oct. 6, 2021), https://www.investopedia.
com/terms/v/verticalintegration.asp [https://perma.cc/ZX7Q-QH5Z] (defining vertical integration
as “a strategy that allows a company to streamline its operations by taking direct ownership of
various stages of its production process rather than relying on external contractors or suppliers”).
231

232
See Karen J. Atkinson & Kathleen M. Nilles, Off. of Indian Energy & Econ. Dev.,
Tribal Business Structure Handbook, at II-1, Chart: Structure at a Glance (2008), https://www.
irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/tribal_business_structure_handbook.pdf [https://perma.cc/4SUC-PC4E]; 26
U.S.C. § 7871 (2018) (treating Indian tribes similarly to states for tax purposes).
233
Tribes must be sued in tribal courts for events arising on tribal lands. See Williams v. Lee,
358 U.S. 217 (1959).
234

See Transcript of TERA Consultation, supra note 222, at 33.

About Us, Navajo Nation Oil and Gas Co., https://www.nnogc.com/ [https://perma.
cc/Y87M-5Q6F] (last visited Nov. 13, 2021).
235

236

Our Purpose, supra note 12.

Off. of Self Governance, Indian Affs., U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, https://www.bia.gov/
as-ia/osg [https://perma.cc/8X2N-9JBN] (last visited Nov. 13, 2021).
237

238

Transcript of TERA Consultation, supra note 222, at 13–21, 74.
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B. Constitutional Challenges
Tribes should levy constitutional challenges to the vexing federal regulations
standing in the way of tribal oil and gas development. Indians occupy a unique
position in the United States’ constitutional order.239 As sovereigns preexisting the
formation of the United States, tribal governments are not bound by the United
States Constitution.240 Tribes’ peculiar status has enabled the United States to assert
extraconstitutional plenary power when legislating in Indian affairs.241 The plenary
power derives from the antiquated and bigoted belief in Indian racial and cultural
inferiority rather than the text of the United States Constitution.242 Once wholly
unbridled,243 Congress now must exercise its power in the best interest of Indians.244
Federal Indian country oil regulations do not satisfy this criterion.
Laws must serve a legitimate governmental purpose; otherwise, the law violates
the Constitution.245 The regulations on Indian country energy do not cross the
legitimacy threshold, so the regulations violate the Constitution. There is no

Cherokee v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 16 (1831) (“The condition of the Indians in
relation to the United States is perhaps unlike that of any other two people in existence.”).
239

240
See Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 782 (1991) (noting that tribes
surrendered no powers at the Constitutional Convention); Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896)
(holding the Bill of Rights does not apply to Indian tribes).
241

United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384–85 (1886).

United States v. Bryant, 136 S. Ct. 1954, 1968–69 (2016) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“[U]
ntil the Court rejects the fiction that Congress possesses plenary power over Indian affairs, our
precedents will continue to be based on the paternalistic theory that Congress must assume allencompassing control over the ‘remnants of a race’ for its own good.”); Frank Pommersheim,
Broken Landscape: Indians, Indian Tribes, And The Constitution 46 (2009) (“Plenary
authority in Indian affairs is not rooted in the text or history of the Constitution but in the text
and history of colonialism—a colonialism in which a ‘conquered people’ only has authority at the
“sufferance” of the ‘conqueror.’”); Robert A. Williams, Jr., Like A Loaded Weapon 72 (2005)
(“Significantly, the plenary power doctrine was generated directly out of the principles of white racial
superiority affirmed by the Marshall model’s originating precedents in a series of major nineteenthcentury Supreme Court decisions that followed the Marshall Trilogy.”); Robert N. Clinton, There
Is No Federal Supremacy Clause for Indian Tribes, 34 Ariz. St. L.J. 113, 163 (2002) (“Indeed,
this section demonstrates how the so-called federal Indian plenary power doctrine under which
Congress claims complete, virtually unlimited, legislative control over any matter involving Indians,
including the very continued existence of the Indian tribes, merely constitutes a racist American relic
of ‘white man’s burden’ arguments employed to justify American colonialism.”); Crepelle, Citing
Racist Precedent, supra note 25, at 553 (“The Supreme Court’s reliance on the Commerce Clause as
a basis for Congress’s plenary power over Indians is a procrustean effort to justify precedent oozing
with white supremacist ideology.”); Nell Jessup Newton, Federal Power over Indians: Its Sources,
Scope, and Limitations, 132 U. Penn. L. Rev. 195, 236 (1984) (“[A]n important rationale for the
Plenary Power Doctrine was the perceived racial and cultural inferiority of Indians.”).
242

See Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565 (1903) (“In one of the cited cases it was
clearly pointed out that Congress possessed a paramount power over the property of the Indians, by
reason of its exercise of guardianship over their interests, and that such authority might be implied,
even though opposed to the strict letter of a treaty with the Indians.”).
243

244

See United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 416–17 (1980).

See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 593 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting ) (“All other
liberty interests may be abridged or abrogated pursuant to a validly enacted state law if that law is
245
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legitimate reason why it should take forty-nine steps to produce energy in Indian
country while it only takes four outside.246 Whatever noble purpose this bureaucracy
theoretically serves, this bureaucracy empirically harms tribes. Time and again,
federal ineptitude has resulted in the gross mismanagement of tribal resources.247
One federal court described the bureaucracy as irredeemably outdated:
Alas, our “modern” Interior department has time and again demonstrated
that it is a dinosaur—the morally and culturally oblivious hand-me-down
of a disgracefully racist and imperialist government that should have been
buried a century ago, the last pathetic outpost of the indifference and
anglocentrism we thought we had left behind.248
Tribes have no recourse when the federal government messes up either.249 Plus, the
overarching federal control contradicts the federal government’s policy of promoting
tribal self-governance.250 The irrationally dense regulations on tribal energy seem
ripe for a constitutional challenge on substantive due process grounds.

rationally related to a legitimate state interest.”); Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993) (“Such
a classification cannot run afoul of the Equal Protection Clause if there is a rational relationship
between the disparity of treatment and some legitimate governmental purpose.”); City of New
Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) (“Unless a classification trammels fundamental
personal rights or is drawn upon inherently suspect distinctions such as race, religion, or alienage,
our decisions presume the constitutionality of the statutory discriminations and require only that
the classification challenged be rationally related to a legitimate state interest.”).
246
Adam Crepelle, White Tape and Indian Wards: Removing the Federal Bureaucracy to
Empower Tribal Economies and Self-Government, 54 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 563, 566 (2021) (“Indian
country’s nonsensically complex regulatory framework was not born of indigenous ingenuity; rather,
Indian country’s byzantine legal landscape is a consequence of centuries-old colonial ideology.”).
247
See id. at 589 (“Studies consistently show that non-Indian fee land is significantly more
productive than adjacent trust land, and as additional proof of the failure of trust land, the United
States has ‘lost’ billions of dollars from Indian trust land accounts.”). See also Cherokee Nation v.
United States Dep’t of the Interior, No. 19-cv-2154-TNM-ZMF, 2021 WL 1232712 *1 (D.D.C.
Apr. 1, 2021) (“The Nation has sued for an accounting of its Trust Funds from the Department
of the Interior and other federal defendants (collectively, the ‘Government’).”); Andrew Kennard,
Class Action Settlement Brings $59 Million to Descendents [sic] of the Pembina Band of Chippewa
Indians, Native News Online (June 18, 2021), https://nativenewsonline.net/currents/class-actionsettlement-brings-59-million-to-descendents-of-the-pembina-band-of-chippewa-indians [https://
perma.cc/S275-RYSJ] (“A $59 million settlement in Peltier v. Haaland, a class action lawsuit alleging
trust fund mismanagement and failure to account by the Department of the Interior, will go to four
tribes located in the Midwest and Northwest United States and more than 39,000 beneficiaries.”).

Cobell v. Norton, 229 F.R.D. 5, 7 (D.D.C. 2005), vacated sub nom. Cobell v. Kempthorne,
455 F.3d 317 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
248

See United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 564 U.S. 162, 181–82 (2011); United States
v. Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. 488, 514 (2003); United States v. Navajo Nation, 556 U.S. 287, 289
(2009).
249

250
Statement on Signing the PROGRESS for Indian Tribes Act of 2019, 2020 Daily
Comp. Pres. Doc. 1 (Oct. 21, 2020) (“Today, I have signed into law S. 209, the ‘PROGRESS for
Indian Tribes Act of 2019’ (the “Act”). This Act makes several amendments to enhance tribal selfgovernance under the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975 (ISDEAA)
and helps promote my Administration’s goal of further empowering tribes.”).
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Additionally, the United States cannot take tribal property without providing
just compensation.251 Although the extensive regulations governing tribal oil
development do not physically take tribal property, a regulatory taking can
occur when a government regulation deprives landowners of the beneficial use
of their property.252 The United States’ ownership of trust land seems to provide
it with broad authority to regulate trust lands.253 However, the Supreme Court
has acknowledged Indian title is “as sacred as the fee simple of the whites”254 and
“[t]he right of perpetual and exclusive occupancy of the land is not less valuable
than full title in fee.”255 While tribes do not own trust lands, tribes do own the
minerals and natural resources on trust lands.256 The current federal regulatory
regime deprives tribes of their ability to access their minerals. This precedent should
provide tribes with a solid basis to launch a regulatory takings action against the
immense regulatory web smothering Indian country energy development.
C. Blockchain to Improve Land and Mineral Bureaucracy
Improving the federal land and mineral bureaucracy will make Indian country
oil production much more efficient. Land and mineral record mismanagement
have plagued the BIA for decades.257 While the BIA has made efforts to improve

See United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 424 (1980) (“That taking
implied an obligation on the part of the Government to make just compensation to the Sioux
Nation, and that obligation, including an award of interest, must now, at last, be paid.”).
251

252
Richard A. Epstein, Physical and Regulatory Takings: One Distinction Too Many, 64 Stan. L.
Rev. Online 99, 101 (2012) (“Regulatory takings, in contrast, leave landowners in possession, but
subject them to restrictions on the ability to use, develop, or dispose of the land.”); Robert Meltz,
Cong. Rsch. Serv., 97-122, Takings Decisions Of The U.S. Supreme Court: A Chronology
1 (2015), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/97-122.pdf [https://perma.cc/M2CH-U8XR] (“This critical
expansion of takings jurisprudence to ‘regulatory takings’ acknowledged that purely regulatory
interferences with property rights can have economic and other consequences for property owners
as significant as appropriations and physical invasions.”).
253
See Kristina Alexander & Ross W. Gorte, Cong. Rsch. Serv., RL34267,
Federal Land Ownership: Constitutional Authority and the History of Acquisition,
Disposal, and Retention, at CRS-2 (2007), https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20071203_
RL34267_84a00d87ee13de87c2dcce1aa457f1c6d8601f1b.pdf [https://perma.cc/W75G-6Y8W]
(“This provision provides broad authority for Congress to govern the lands acquired by the federal
government as it sees fit, and to exercise exclusive authority to decide on whether or not to dispose
of those lands.”).
254

United States v. Santa Fe Pac. R. Co., 314 U.S. 339, 345 (1941).

255

United States v. Shoshone Tribe of Indians of Wind River Rsrv., 304 U.S. 111, 116

(1938).

Id. at 117 (“The treaty, though made with knowledge that there were mineral deposits and
standing timber in the reservation, contains nothing to suggest that the United States intended to
retain for itself any beneficial interest in them.”).
256

257
See Fractioned Ownership of Indian Lands: Hearing Before the S. Select Comm. on Indian
Affs., 102d Cong. 93–94 (1992) [hereinafter S. Hearing on Ownership of Indian Land] (statement of
Jeffrey C. Steinhoff, Director, Civ. Audits, Acct. & Fin. Mgmt. Div., U.S. Gen. Acct. Off.).
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these records in recent years,258 the records are still in shoddy shape.259 Tribes
need to assert their authority under the Indian Self-Determination and Education
Assistance Act260 to take over BIA land records management.261 Likewise, tribes
should attempt to control their mineral records.262 Regardless of whether a tribe
or the BIA is responsible, land and mineral record efficiency can be improved
by blockchain.
Blockchain is a digital distributed ledger that is dispersed across a network
of computers.263 Since blockchains are shared across a network, information on a
blockchain can be simultaneously viewed by everyone in the network,264 and every
transaction on a blockchain is recorded across the network.265 In order to update the
ledger and add a new transaction, the ledger must match each transaction recorded
across the entire network.266 Thus, forgery is exceedingly difficult—some think
impossible—on blockchain.267 These features of blockchain allow the technology to

See Bureau of Indian Affs., 51 IAM 4, Indian Affairs Directives Transmittal Sheet:
Examination and Certification of Land Title (2012), https://www.bia.gov/sites/bia.gov/files/
assets/public/raca/manual/pdf/51IAM4ExaminationandCertificationofLandTitle4-30-2012.pdf
[https://perma.cc/JCP8-TBAN].
258

259

GAO-15-502, supra note 112, at 18–20.

Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-638,
88 Stat. 2203 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 5301–5423).
260

James Robert Colombe, Shortening the TSR Timeline: A Proposal to End Delays that
Hinder Native Homeownership, Fed. Res. Bank of Minneapolis (Sept. 9, 2020), https://www.
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improve transaction speed and security.268 Blockchain technology has applications
in countless sectors.269 One of the most celebrated is land registry.270
Land is a major source of wealth around the world.271 Accessing land usually
requires going through a government land registry. Even in the best run land
registry, delays resulting from intermediaries and human error are possible.272
Outright corruption in land registries is plausible too, and quite common in poorly
run land registries.273 Accordingly, the Republic of Georgia was the first country
to put its land registry on a blockchain,274 in part to increase public confidence in
its land registry.275 The Georgian blockchain experiment has been a success as the
World Bank ranked it the third easiest country in the world to register property in
2016.276 More developed countries, like Sweden, are implementing blockchain to
reduce costs and improve the efficiency of their land registries.277
Despite the ability to transform land management bureaucracy, blockchain
land registries do not work in a vacuum. The blockchain land registry will only
268
Green, supra note 266 (“Blockchain technology can be used to reduce costs, speed up
transactions, and improve data security for financial institutions, health care providers, businesses,
and more.”).
269
Id. (“Although blockchain technology hasn’t yet been widely adopted, it has the potential
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270
See Nir Kshetri & Richard Rogers, Blockchain-Based Property Registries May Help Lift
Poor People Out of Poverty, gov’t tech., https://www.govtech.com/computing/blockchain-basedproperty-registries-may-help-lift-poor-people-out-of-poverty.html
[https://perma.cc/FM8AMJZL] (last visited Nov. 13, 2021) (“Blockchain-based land registries have started up in Bermuda,
Brazil, Georgia, Ghana, Honduras, India, Russia and Rwanda.”).
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the center of development challenges.”).
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be as good as the data uploaded to it, and Indian country’s land records are not
high quality.278 Indian country’s digital infrastructure is sorely lacking too, like the
internet;279 thus, reservation residents without internet access will have limited
access to blockchain land registries. Additionally, bureaucratic inertia within the
BIA may present an obstacle to blockchain registries.280 Blockchain’s benefits will
not come to Indian country overnight.
Nonetheless, blockchain can ameliorate the bureaucratic issues impacting
Indian country energy development. As discussed, the BIA needs to update its land
and mineral records anyway. A blockchain based registry may inspire the BIA to
expedite the record management effort. Placing Indian country’s land and mineral
records on a blockchain makes the records quickly and easily accessible. Putting
records on blockchain will drastically reduce the costs currently associated with
Indian country title searches. Reduced costs and increased access to records will
make Indian country oil production much more efficient. Plus, blockchain helps
prevent the BIA from losing records. While experimenting with new technology
comes with risk, the risk-reward calculus clearly swings towards roll the dice given
the BIA’s historical record mismanagement. Indian country land and mineral record
management can only be improved by blockchain.

V. Conclusion
President Biden showed support for Indian country by naming Deb Haaland
Secretary of the Interior. He can show further support for Indian country by
slashing the red tape impeding tribal energy sovereignty. The TERA amendments,
despite their flaws, show a willingness to provide tribes with greater control over
their natural resources. During the past decade, Congress has expanded tribal
jurisdiction,281 and the Supreme Court recently unanimously affirmed a tribal
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assertion of civil jurisdiction over a non-Indian who had minimal contact with the
tribe.282 And in 2020, Congress held the first hearing on tribal tax issues in many
years.283 Reform will no doubt happen; the only question is when. In the meantime,
tribes must work within the existing legal framework. TEDOs, constitutional
challenges, and blockchain are three ways tribes can push the frontier of tribal
sovereignty in the oil industry.

54; Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-211, 124 Stat. 2258 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 25 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.).
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